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Part I
INTRODUCTION
A. THE INDEFENSIBLE POLICY AND INCOMPREHENSIBLE LAW CREATED BY
SPEECHNOW.ORG V. FEC
In 2010, two months after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v.
FEC, 1 the D.C. Circuit held all limits on contributions to super PACs
unconstitutional. Its decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC 2 created a regime in
which contributions to candidates for office are limited but in which
contributions to “independent expenditure committees” urging votes for
these candidates are unbounded.
In the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, federal law barred
hedge fund manager Donald Sussman from contributing as much as $5500
to Hillary Clinton’s campaign. It barred hedge fund manager Robert Mercer
from contributing $5500 to Donald Trump’s campaign. The law capped
contributions to campaigns for federal office at $2700 per election or $5400
for both the primary and general elections. 3 Forty years earlier, the Supreme
Court had upheld limits on contributions to candidates in Buckley v. Valeo. 4
But federal law did not prohibit Donald Sussman from contributing $21
million to Priorities USA Action, a super PAC whose principal mission was
to place advertisements on behalf of Clinton. 5 And federal law did not bar
Robert Mercer from contributing $15.5 million to Make America Number
1, a super PAC that supported Ted Cruz in the Republican primaries and
1

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
599 F.3d. 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
3
52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a) (West 2016); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and
Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530m
8532
(Feb.
6,
2013);
Contributions,
Fed.
Election
Comm’n,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml (visited on Apr. 21, 2015) (providing the
inflation-adjusted limits for 2015-16).
4
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
5
See Outside Spending: Sussman, S. Donald: Donor Detail, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2016&id=U0000004
604&type=I&super=N&name=Sussman%2C+S.+Donald (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015462

3

LIMITING SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 8, 2017]

Trump in the general election. 6 Until 2010, a federal statute limited
contributions to groups like Priorities USA Action and Make America
Number 1 to $5000 per year, 7 but SpeechNow held this statute
unconstitutional.
“Super PACs” or “independent expenditure committees” are groups that
do not make contributions to candidates but instead place their own
advertisements supporting candidates and/or disparaging their opponents.
Although these groups may not coordinate their expenditures with those of
an official campaign, 8 their managers often understand that their job is to
attack an opponent while the candidate they support takes a higher road. 9
Super PACs have been called “the attack dogs and provocateurs of modern
politics.” 10 The advertisements they produce contribute to the nation’s
cynicism about politics, a cynicism that runs especially deep among young
people. 11 The candidates they support need not take responsibility for what
6

See Outside Spending: Robert L. Mercer: Donor Detail, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2016&id=U0000003
682&type=I&super=S&name=Mercer%2C+Robert+L. (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
7
52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (West 2016).
8
See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20-.23 (2009). “Independent expenditure committees” need
not be entirely independent. Candidates may, within limits, solicit donations to these
groups and may speak at their gatherings. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY
OPINION 2011-12 (June 30, 2011), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202011-12-pdf. They
may thank contributors for making donations to super PAC, share fundraising consultants
with super PACs, and provide lists of prospective donors to super PACs. Note, Working
Together for an Independent Expenditure, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1480, 1485-86
(2015). A recent solicitation for funds by a super PAC advised a prospective donor, “We
are the blessed Super PAC by Sen. Toomey. I am his former senior aide and finance
director, and I am working with his former chief-of-staff.” Robert Faturechi & Lauren
Kirchner, Super PAC to Billionaire: We Need More Money to Save a Republican Senate,
PRO PUBLICA, Oct. 14, 2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/super-pac-to-billionairewe-need-more-money-to-save-a-republican-senate.
9
See David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super PACs—in 1 Chart,
THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/theincredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-in-1-chart/363643/ (reporting that, in the 2012
presidential campaign, Republican super PACs spent three times more attacking the
Democratic candidate than they did supporting the Republican candidate and that
Democratic super PACs spent nine times more attacking the Republican candidate than
they did supporting their own candidate).
10
Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative “Super PACs” Synchronize Their Messages, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/conservativesuper- pacs-sharpen-their-synchronized-message.html.
11
See Sheryl Gay Stolenberg, For “Millennials,” a Tide of Cynicism and a Partisan
Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/us/politics/formillennial-voters-a-tide-of-cynicism-toward-politics.html;
Beyond
Distrust:
How
Americans View Their Government, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Nov. 23, 2015,
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-theirgovernment/.
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they say, and the groups usually disappear once an election is over.
Limits on contributions to candidates no longer restrict how much
people can give to electoral efforts. They simply require contributors to
channel their funds to less responsible and more destructive speakers. 12 No
sane legislator would vote in favor of this system of campaign financing,
and none ever has. The United States has this topsy-turvy regime because
the D.C. Circuit held that the First Amendment requires it.
The thought that the Constitution requires this toxic state of affairs,
however, is astonishing. According to the Supreme Court, Congress may
prohibit a $5500 contribution to an official campaign because this
contribution is corrupting or creates the appearance of corruption. 13
According to the D.C. Circuit, however, Congress may not prohibit a $20
million contribution to a super PAC because this contribution does not
corrupt or create even an appearance of corruption. 14 The D.C. Circuit
reached this conclusion, not on the basis of empirical investigation, but “as a
matter of law.” 15
B. THE SPEECHNOW SYLLOGISM
The D.C. Circuit did not argue that the system of campaign financing it
created was desirable or defensible, and it did not argue that the law it
created was sound or coherent. The court made no effort to distinguish
contributions to super PACs from contributions to candidates. It offered no
defense of the merits of its ruling. The court simply announced that a single
sentence of the Citizens United opinion compelled its result.
The Supreme Court wrote in Citizens United, “We now conclude that
12

See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412, 455 (2013) (“I am skeptical of any governmental effort to police
campaign speech to make it less negative, vitriolic, or immoderate, but there is little to be
said for laws that exacerbate these vices.”). Donors typically give the maximum allowable
amount to the candidates they favor and then make additional donations to super PACs
supporting the same candidates. They apparently seek to obtain with super PAC
contributions what the law prevents them from getting with direct donations to candidates.
See Stephen R. Weissman, The SpeechNow Case and the Real World of Campaign
Finance at 2-6 (Tables 1 & 2), FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE (Oct. 2016),
https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/FSFP-Weissman-Reportfinal-10-24-16.pdf.
13
Buckley said, “It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit
the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1000
contribution limitation.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
14
SpeechNow said, “[C]ontributions to groups that make independent expenditures . . .
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
15
Id.
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independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption,” 16 and the D.C. Circuit declared, “In light of the
Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or create the appearance of corruption, contributions to groups that
make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.” 17 This Article will refer to this declaration as the
SpeechNow syllogism: If the money going out of a super PAC doesn’t
corrupt, the money coming into a super PAC can’t corrupt either.
Citizens United and SpeechNow presented very different issues. In
Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down limits on a political group’s
expenditures while the issue in SpeechNow was the validity of limiting
contributions to a political group. The Court has treated these two sorts of
restrictions differently. In Buckley v. Valeo, although the Court upheld limits
on contributions to candidates and political parties, 18 it struck down limits
on expenditures by candidates and parties. 19 It also struck down limits on
expenditures by individuals and groups that independently advocate a
candidate’s election. 20
Decisions since Buckley have confirmed that expenditure limits and
contribution limits are judged by different standards. Limits on expenditures
are subject to strict scrutiny. These limits must “further a compelling
interest” and must be “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” 21
Contribution limits are not subject to strict scrutiny. These limits must
merely be “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” 22 In
the years since Buckley, the Supreme Court has struck down every
expenditure limit to come before it, but it has upheld most contribution
limits. 23 A later section of this Article will discuss the reasons for the
16

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
18
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35.
19
Id. at 54-58.
20
Id. at 39-51.
21
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)).
22
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000); FEC v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 158-59 (2003).
23
The Court struck down expenditure limits in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238 (1986); Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)
(Colorado I); and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
The Court upheld contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 47 (1976);
California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377 (2000); and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003). It struck down
contribution limits in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1982)
17
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Court’s distinction. 24
Citizens United did not disrupt the pattern of the earlier cases. The
Supreme Court observed that “contribution limits, . . . unlike limits on
independent expenditures, have been an accepted means of preventing quid
pro quo corruption.” 25 In its opening paragraph, its closing paragraph, and
many places in between, the Supreme Court emphasized that the case before
it concerned only expenditure limits.
In SpeechNow, the court acknowledged for purposes of decision that the
case before it concerned only contribution limits and that these limits were
not subject to strict scrutiny. The court nevertheless saw Citizens United as
effectively resolving the contribution-limit issue the Supreme Court had set
aside. The SpeechNow syllogism rendered the distinction between
contributions and expenditures irrelevant:
[B]ecause Citizens United holds that independent expenditures do
not corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law,
then the government can have no anti-corruption interest in
limiting
contributions
to
independent
expenditure-only
organizations. No matter which standard of review governs
contribution limits, the limits on contributions to SpeechNow
cannot stand. 26
In Citizens United, according to the D.C. Circuit, “the [Supreme] Court
held that the government had no anti-corruption interest in limiting
independent expenditures.” 27 It italicized the word no. Whatever the
standard of review might be, the Court said, “something . . . outweighs
nothing every time.” 28 Acknowledging even a smidgen, soupçon, or scintilla
of regulatory interest would have undercut the court’s analysis entirely.
(declaring limits on contributions to groups supporting or opposing referendums
unconstitutional because these contributions pose no risk of corrupting public officials);
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s extremely low limits); and
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating limits on the total amount an
individual may contribute to all candidates and political committees during a single
election cycle).
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
(Colorado II), the Court said, “[W]e have routinely struck down limitations on independent
expenditures by candidates, other individuals, and groups while repeatedly upholding
contribution limits.” Id. at 441-42 (emphasis and citations omitted).
24
See Part III infra.
25
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; see id. at 356 (similarly stressing Buckley’s
distinction between expenditures and contributions).
26
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 696.
27
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 693 (emphasis in the original).
28
Id. at 695.
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Under the Supreme Court’s two-tiered standard of review, an interest that
cannot justify a restriction of expenditures can justify a restriction of
contributions, but the government may not restrict even low-value speech
when its interest in doing so is nonexistent.
SpeechNow was a unanimous en banc decision. The court’s syllogism
persuaded all nine of its judges, including the three appointed by Democrats.
In the years since SpeechNow, its syllogism has convinced five additional
federal courts of appeals to strike down limits on contributions to super
PACs. 29 The Federal Election Commission has acquiesced in the
SpeechNow decision, 30 and academic criticism of the ruling has been
sparse. 31 One commentator declared that Citizens United “utterly removed
room for argument about Super PACs” 32 and “made SpeechNow an easy
case with only one possible outcome.” 33
The Justice Department did not seek Supreme Court review of the
SpeechNow decision. Attorney General Eric Holder explained in a letter to
Senator Harry Reid, “[T]he court of appeals decision will affect only a small
29

Some of these decisions approved only preliminary injunctions. They thus resolved
the question tentatively but not definitively. See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741
F.3d 1089, 1095-96, 1103 (10th Cir. 2013) (approving a preliminary injunction); New York
Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487, 489 (2d Cir. 2013) (approving a
preliminary injunction); Vermont Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 140 (2d
Cir. 2014) (a decision after New York Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, supra, that
expressly left open whether the Second Circuit should follow SpeechNow); Texans for Free
Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 537-38 n.3 (5th 2013) (approving a
preliminary injunction); Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664
F.3d 139, 154-55 (7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 896 (2010). In all of
the cases striking down limitations on contributions to super PACS, government lawyers
argued that contribution limits differed from expenditure limits, and, in all of them, courts
responded by endorsing the SpeechNow syllogism. The Seventh Circuit described this
syllogism as “inexorable.” Barland, 664 F.3d at 154. One other court of appeals had made
a ruling resembling SpeechNow prior to the D.C. Circuit’s decision. See N.C. Right to Life,
Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008). See also EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d
1, 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (a D.C. Circuit precursor of SpeechNow).
30
See
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
ADVISORY
OPINION
2010-11,
http://saos.fec.gov./aodocs/AO%202010-11pdf (Commonsense 10).
31
One of the authors of this Article did criticize SpeechNow. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67
FLA. L. REV. 389 (2015). Alschuler’s criticism appeared, however, amidst a 120-page
article addressing other topics. With his permission and that of the Florida Law Review,
this co-authored Article sometimes recycles passages of Alschuler’s earlier article without
using quotation marks or noting the pages of the earlier article where this material
appeared.
32
Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1912
(2013).
33
Id. at 1911.
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subset of federally regulated contributions.” 34
Holder’s statement belongs on a historic list of wrong predictions near
that of the manager of the Grand Ole Opry who told Elvis Pressley, “You
ain’t goin’ nowhere, son—you ought to go back to drivin’ a truck.” 35 In
2016, 2,389 super PACs campaigning in federal elections raised $1.8
billion. 36 Sixty-one percent of this amount came from 100 donors
(individuals and groups), 37 and 43% percent came from the top 100
individual donors. 38 The amounts given by these top donors ranged from
$89.5 million (Thomas Steyer) to $1.4 million (Steven Spielberg). 39 The
average amount contributed by the top donors was $7.7 million. 40 What
Attorney General Holder called “a small subset of federally regulated
contributions” has become the creature that ate federal election law.
Although seven years have passed since SpeechNow, the Supreme Court has
not decided whether Congress’s limits on contributions to super PACs are
valid.
This Article offers three criticisms of the SpeechNow syllogism:
1. The syllogism is fallacious. Contributions to super PACs can
corrupt even when expenditures by these groups do not.

34
Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid, July 10, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/0616-2010.pdf. Although the Justice Department did not seek certiorari in SpeechNow, it filed
a brief in opposition to a petition for certiorari in which the plaintiffs claimed that they had
not won enough and that independent expenditure committees like SpeechNow should not
be required to register as political committees at all. See Brief for the Respondent in
Opposition, Keating v. FEC, 526 U.S. 1003 (2010) (No. 10-144) (denying a writ of
certiorari to review SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
35
See Victor Navasky, Tomorrow Never Knows, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 29,
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/magazine/tomorrow-never-knows.html (also
reporting Albert Einstein’s 1932 statement, “There is not the slightest chance that [nuclear]
energy will ever be attainable”).
36
See 2016 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?chrt=V&type=S (last visited Mar.
16, 2017).
37
See 2016 Super PACs: How Many Donors Give?, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
(last
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=I
visited Mar. 16, 2017).
38
Id.
39
See 2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&disp=D&type=V&s
uperonly=S (last visited Mar. 16, 2017).
40
Id.
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2. The major premise of the syllogism—Citizens United’s
statement that independent expenditures do not corrupt—was
dictum, a nonbinding aside.
3. Other statements in the Citizens United opinion and a Supreme
Court decision shortly before Citizens United make clear that
the Supreme Court did not mean that independent expenditures
do not corrupt at all.
Following this Article’s criticism of the SpeechNow syllogism, it will
consider an argument for the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that the D.C. Circuit did
not make. The contribution limits that the Supreme Court has upheld have
all been limits on contributions to candidates, political parties, and other
groups that contribute to candidates or coordinate their expenditures with
candidates. Perhaps the Court meant to distinguish contributions to
candidates from all other forms of campaign financing. Perhaps it
distinguished contributions from expenditures because it believed that
candidates cannot be corrupted by funds whose expenditure they do not
control. On this view, contributions to super PACs are not truly
contributions. They are expenditures.
As this Article will show, this argument for the SpeechNow result misses
the reasons the Supreme Court distinguished contributions from
expenditures. The Court did not endorse the untenable view that candidates
and office holders cannot be corrupted by money paid to and spent by
others. It did not imagine that candidates could avoid corruption or the
appearance of corruption by saying, “Please pay the money to my super
PAC.”
Buckley instead pointed to a number of differences between
contributions and expenditures. One of them was that funds whose
expenditure a candidate controls are likely to be more valuable to him than
funds spent by others on his behalf. 41 Another, however, was that “the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the actor.” 42 A review of all of the concerns that
prompted the Supreme Court to distinguish between contributions and
expenditures shows that contributions to super PACs differ from the
expenditures whose restriction the Court has struck down. Contributions to
super PACs, however, cannot reasonably be distinguished from the
contributions to candidates whose restriction the Court has upheld. Super
41
42

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
Id. at 21.
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PAC contributions are indeed contributions.
After addressing the SpeechNow syllogism and exploring the reasons
for the Supreme Court’s distinction between contributions and expenditures,
this Article will next focus on the ultimate question posed by Buckley v.
Valeo. Do unlimited super PAC contributions create a sufficient appearance
of quid pro quo corruption to justify Congressional restriction? The
appearance of corruption created by these contributions is in fact intense,
pervasive, and reasonable. SpeechNow has sharpened class divisions and
helped to tear America apart.
After explaining why limits on contributions to super PACs should
survive Citizens United, this Article will finally note the difficulty of
bringing the issue before the Supreme Court. It will describe the efforts of
this Article’s authors, other lawyers, members of Congress, candidates for
Congress, and the public-interest organization Free Speech for People to
secure an authoritative Supreme Court resolution of the question.
Part II
THE DEFICIENCIES OF SPEECHNOW
A. SPEECHNOW’S SUPPOSED SYLLOGISM IS FALLACIOUS
Although SpeechNow concluded that “contributions to groups that make
independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt,” 43 a federal grand jury took a
different view when, in 2015, it indicted U.S. Senator Robert Menendez and
Dr. Solomon Melgen for bribery. The indictment alleged that Dr. Melgen
made two $300,000 contributions to a super PAC supporting Senator
Menendez’s reelection. According to the indictment, he made these
contributions “in return for MENENDEZ’s advocacy at the highest levels of
[two federal agencies] on behalf of MELGEN in his Medicare billing
dispute.” 44
Menendez and Melgen moved to dismiss the charges based on the super
PAC contributions. They maintained that “no quid pro quo corruption can
arise when a private citizen contributes to a bona fide Super PAC, because a
bona fide Super PAC does not coordinate its expenditures with a
candidate.” 45 A federal court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that the
43

SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
See Indictment at 61-63 (Counts 15-18), United States v. Menendez (D.N.J. 2015)
(No. 15 CR 155), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/04/01/menendez_and_melgen_indictment.pdf.
45
United States v. Menendez, 132 F. Supp. 3d 635, 639 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss).
44
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federal bribery statute forbids corruptly seeking “anything of value
personally or for any other person of entity, in return for being influenced in
the performance of any official act.” 46 The court quoted a Seventh Circuit
decision: “A participant in a scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an
altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other participants.” 47 Just
as a public official cannot escape a bribery conviction by saying, “Please
pay the money to my sister,” he cannot avoid conviction by saying, “Please
pay the money to my alter-ego super PAC.”
Of course we do not know whether the charges against Menendez and
Melgen are true, but a case in which a candidate expressly promises official
action in exchange for a super PAC contribution gives the lie to the bottom
line of the SpeechNow opinion: “[C]ontributions to groups that make
independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt.” 48 Designating an
“independent expenditure group” as an official’s beneficiary cannot legalize
bribe-taking, and it cannot make bribe-taking a First Amendment right.
A super PAC contribution given in return for official favors will be
spent in the same way as other contributions. It will buy advertisements and
bring information to the public. This contribution is no less “speech” than
the other contributions are. If it were true that “contributions to groups that
make independent expenditures . . . cannot corrupt,” the government would
have no interest in regulating this speech. It could no more restrict super
PAC contributions through the law of bribery than it could through
campaign finance law.
The question remains whether the D.C. Circuit fairly disclaimed
responsibility for its unfounded conclusion by pointing to the Supreme
Court. Did this conclusion follow ineluctably from Citizens United’s
declaration that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption
or the appearance of corruption”? 49
Notice that the Menendez-Melgen indictment did not allege that the
super PAC that received Melgen’s funds did anything wrong or that its
expenditures corrupted Menendez. Contrary to the analysis of the D.C.
Circuit, super PAC contributions can corrupt even when these groups’
expenditures do not. The SpeechNow syllogism is fallacious.
Of course a contribution to a super PAC might turn out to have little
value to a candidate if the super PAC never spent it. The corrupting effect of
a contribution, however, does not depend on whether the recipient uses it to
benefit the donor or on whether it is spent at all. A Senator who agreed to
vote in favor of widget subsidies in exchange for a widget maker’s donation
46

Id. at 640 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)) (emphasis added by the court).
Id. (quoting United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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to the Red Cross might see little value in the donation unless the Red Cross
put this donation to use. In such a case, however, the D.C. Circuit surely
would not say that, because the Red Cross’s expenditures did great good and
did not corrupt anyone, the widget maker’s contribution to the Red Cross
could not corrupt either. 50
Corruption by contribution rather than expenditure is in fact what
happens in practice. It is the six-, seven-, and eight-figure donations to super
PACs that have created the appearance (and likely the reality) of corruption,
not the groups’ expenditures. When an op-ed writer complains that the
government has become “like a corporation, with the richest 0.001% buying
shares and demanding board seats,” 51 he speaks of donors to super PACs,
not the operatives who determine how their funds are spent. People who
decry the influence of David and Charles Koch, 52 Sheldon Adelson, 53
George Soros, 54 and George Clooney 55 probably do not know the names of
50

The SpeechNow syllogism seems to rest on the proposition that the greater includes
the lesser. A super PAC’s expenditures typically occur after many contributions have been
assembled and processed. If the super PAC’s final products do not corrupt, their
components cannot corrupt either. But super PAC contributions can corrupt before they
become part of the product. They can corrupt even if they are never spent because a super
PAC manager absconds with them to Rio.
A three-judge federal district court in the District of Columbia clearly repudiated the
SpeechNow syllogism in Republican Party of Louisiana v. FEC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 86
(D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 198 L. Ed. 2d 228 (2017). In an opinion by Circuit Judge Sri
Srinivasan, the court declared that, even when a political party’s soft-money expenditures
are independent of any candidate and do not corrupt, contributions to the party for the
purpose of making these expenditures do corrupt: “[T]he inducement occasioning the
prospect of indebtedness on the part of a federal officeholder is not the spending of money
by the political party. The inducement instead comes from the contribution of soft money
to the party in the first place.” Id. at 97 (emphasis in the original).
The court sought to distinguish SpeechNow by suggesting that the ties between
candidates and political parties are closer than those between candidates and independentexpenditure PACs. Id. at 98. But SpeechNow had not offered this empirical judgment; it
rested on a supposedly compelling logical inference—one that the three-judge panel plainly
did not accept. Moreover, the empirical judgment attributed to SpeechNow was plucked
from the air without evidentiary support. Unlike the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow, the threejudge panel got it right.
51
David M. Magerman, The Oligarchy of the 0.001 Percenters, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER,
March
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2017,
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inqphillydeals/Billionaires_and_Democracy_Magerman_Mercer_Renaissance_Trump_Banno
n_Conway.html.
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See generally JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2016).
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See, e.g., Sheldon Adelson’s Billions Shape US Politics as Many Question His
GUARDIAN,
Nov.
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2012,
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the managers who receive and spend these donors’ funds. It is the checkwriters, not the money spenders, who may have given America its carriedinterest deduction, its sugar subsidies, and its armaments approved by
Congress despite opposition by the Pentagon. A campaign-finance system
like the one authorized by Buckley—one in which contributions are limited
but in which candidates, parties, and super PACS may spend whatever they
receive—would notably limit corruption. As Buckley observed, “The
interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is
achieved by the Act’s contribution limitations and disclosure provisions
rather than . . . campaign expenditure ceilings.” 56
B. THE STATEMENT UPON WHICH THE D.C. CIRCUIT RELIED WAS DICTUM
SpeechNow characterized Citizens United’s statement that independent
expenditures do not corrupt as something the Supreme Court had held as a
matter of law. 57 The Supreme Court’s statement, however, was dictum.
Citizens United was argued twice. After the initial argument, the Court
restored the case to the docket and ordered the parties to address an issue
they had not previously considered. Two of the Court’s earlier decisions had
held that political speech could be restricted simply because the speaker was
a corporation. 58 The Court asked whether these decisions should be
overruled. 59
The first part of the Citizens United opinion did overrule the earlier
decisions. It held that a group’s speech cannot be restricted simply because
the group is incorporated. The Supreme Court declared that the First
Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some and not by others.” 60 It found “no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.” 61 It noted that “[s]peech
Brothers, WESTERN JOURNALISM, Apr. 24, 2014, http://www.westernjournalism.com/kochbrothers-george-soros-fear/.
55
See, e.g., George Clooney Wants You to BELIEVE He Doesn’t Buy Political
Influence, BUZZKIX.COM, Oct. 3, 2016, http://buzzkix.com/george-clooney-wants-you-tobelieve-he-doesnt-buy-political-influence/.
56
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
57
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
58
See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
59
Order of June 29, 2009, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08available
at
205.htm.
60
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
61
Id. at 341.
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restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a
means to control content.” 62 It concluded that “the Government cannot
restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.” 63
This holding fully resolved the case before the Court. A statute restricted
a group’s political expenditures only because the group was a corporation.
This statute was unconstitutional. However strong the government’s
regulatory interest might have been, the government could not advance this
interest by limiting only corporate speech. The group won its case.
The Supreme Court, however, did not stop. It noted that Buckley v.
Valeo had regarded only one interest as “sufficiently important” to justify
limiting campaign contributions and expenditures—“the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption.” 64 It added, “When Buckley
identified a sufficiently important interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption.” 65 The Court concluded, “The anticorruption interest is not
sufficient to displace the speech here in question.” 66 This statement fully
resolved the case before the Court a second time.
Either branch of the Citizens United opinion would have sufficed
without the other. Once the Court had held that the government may not
restrict independent expenditures on the basis of corporate identity, there
was no reason for it to consider whether the government may not restrict
independent expenditures at all. And if the Court had said initially that
independent expenditures are insufficiently corrupting for Congress ever to
restrict them, there would have been no reason for it to consider whether this
speech-related activity may be restricted on the basis of corporate identity.
Offering both conclusions at once contravened the familiar principle that
a court should not decide constitutional issues in advance of necessity. 67
This principle means among other things that a court should not make two
constitutional rulings when one will do. As Chief Justice Roberts observed
before joining the Supreme Court, “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it
is necessary not to decide more.” 68
Even after resolving the case before it twice, the Supreme Court did not
stop. Three sentences after it declared, “The anticorruption interest is not
sufficient to displace the speech here in question,” it offered the statement
62

Id. at 340.
Id. at 346.
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Id. at 345 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 25 (1975)).
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Id. at 359.
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Id. at 357.
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See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-67 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
68
PDK Labs, Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
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that drove the SpeechNow decision: “[W]e now conclude that independent
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” 69 The Court’s initial statement declared the anticorruption
interest insufficient to support any restriction of independent expenditures.
The D.C. Circuit saw the second statement as pronouncing this interest
nonexistent. So interpreted, the statement went far beyond any issue before
the Court.
If the Court had stopped after its initial statement, the D.C. Circuit could
not have written the opinion it wrote in SpeechNow. The major premise of
the court’s syllogism would not have existed. The court could not have
declared that “the [Supreme] Court held that the government had no anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.” 70 It could not have
relied on the proposition that “something . . . outweighs nothing every
time.” 71 The court would have been required to assess the strength of the
government’s regulatory interest, recognizing that an interest too weak to
justify a restriction of expenditures can justify a restriction of contributions.
In a decision that followed Citizens United, four dissenting Justices
criticized Citizens United’s description of the kind of corruption needed to
justify a restriction of independent expenditures. They observed that the
Court’s language should be regarded “as dictum, as an overstatement, or as
limited to the context in which it appears.” 72 These Justices were correct.
Indeed, the statement that became major premise of the SpeechNow
syllogism was not merely dictum; it was doubly dictum.
C. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT MEAN ITS DICTUM LITERALLY
One might take a conspiratorial view of Citizens United’s ambiguous
dictum that independent expenditures do not corrupt. Perhaps five Justices
of the Supreme Court, realizing that Justices with their perspective might
not constitute a majority of the Court forever, reached out to resolve issues
not before them, including the issue that soon came before the D.C. Circuit
in SpeechNow. Perhaps these activist Justices truly meant to say that
independent expenditures do not corrupt even a smidgen, and perhaps they
swept broadly in a calculated effort to control the future. We doubt,
however, that the Justices in the majority had any grand or devious strategy.
It seems to us much more likely that they did not mean their dictum to be
taken in the way the D.C. Circuit took it.
69
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The Supreme Court slipped easily from its declaration that independent
expenditures are insufficiently corrupting to justify their restriction to its
declaration that these expenditures do not corrupt at all. Under Buckley’s
two-tiered standard of review, these two statements have very different
consequences, but the Court gave no sign that it recognized any notable
difference between them. 73
The Court again indicated that it failed to notice any important
difference between its two formulations when it attributed the stronger of
these formulations to Buckley. It wrote, “This confirms Buckley’s reasoning
that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of,
quid pro quo corruption.” 74 Buckley, however, had said no such thing. It had
endorsed only the weaker formulation: “We find that the governmental
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is
inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.” 75
And again: “[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the provision does
not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption
comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.” 76
The clearest indication that the Court did not mean its dictum literally is
that this statement, if taken literally, would be inconsistent with a ruling the
Court made less than a year before it decided Citizens United. The opinion
in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 77 was written by Justice Kennedy, the
same justice who wrote the Court’s opinion in Citizens United. 78 Caperton
concerned contributions and expenditures made by the chief executive
officer of the Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship.
After a jury returned a $50 million verdict against Massey, Blankenship
spent more than $3 million to prevent the reelection of a justice of the state
supreme court that would hear Massey’s appeal. The incumbent justice was
defeated, and his replacement provided the decisive vote for reversing the
$50 million verdict against Massey.
The Supreme Court held that the newly elected justice’s refusal to
recuse himself from the coal company’s appeal violated the Due Process
Clause. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “We conclude that there is a
73

Slight literary imprecision can have huge consequences. See, e.g., O’Connor v.
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serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing
the judge on the case by raising funds . . . when the case was pending or
imminent.” 79 The opinion in Citizens United distinguished Caperton by
noting that Caperton’s “holding was limited to the rule that the judge must
be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.” 80
Judicial recusal and limiting independent expenditures are indeed
different remedies, and Caperton’s ruling that the Constitution required one
of these remedies was consistent with Citizens United’s ruling that the
Constitution precluded the other. If Blankenship’s expenditures did “not
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” however, why was
any remedy required? Could the expenditures have produced “a serious risk
of actual bias” without giving rise to an appearance of corruption? A near
army of commentators have observed that Caperton’s holding is
inconsistent with Citizens United’s statement that “independent
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.” 81
When the Supreme Court has spoken carelessly and without fully
considering the implications of a statement, lower courts and the Court
itself have found ways to say with the legendary comedian Gilda Radner
“never mind.” For example, early in the Citizens United opinion, the Court
declared that the First Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some and not by others.” 82
The Court apparently referred to all forms of speech, including political
contributions and expenditures. Two years after Citizens United, however,
79
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the Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding a ban on
political contributions and expenditures by noncitizens who are not
permanent residents of the United States. 83 The Court’s statement that the
government may not restrict speech on the basis of a speaker’s identity
evidently had become inoperative. 84
Citizens United said more narrowly, “[T]he Government cannot restrict
political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.” 85 This statement
in fact appeared to be Citizens United’s holding. Taking the Court’s
statement literally, however, would give corporations the same right as
individuals to contribute to candidates, and the number of corporations an
individual can form is unlimited. A person should not be able to contribute
101 times the individual contribution limit simply because he has created
100 corporations. Perhaps the Court did not consider fully the implications
of its statement.
After Citizens United, four federal courts of appeals upheld Congress’s
century-old prohibition of political contributions by corporations, 86 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in two of the cases. 87 The declaration that
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s
corporate identity” also seemed to have become inoperative.
Lower courts and the Supreme Court itself have tempered a literal
reading of Citizens United’s broad pronouncements with common sense.
The D.C. Circuit should have done the same thing in SpeechNow. Instead,
the court based its analysis of whether the Constitution guarantees the right
to give $10 million to a super PAC entirely on an imprecise Supreme Court
dictum. The court read this statement for all it might be worth and then
some. The Supreme Court’s dictum supplied the only support the lower
court offered for its conclusion that contributions to super PACs cannot
83
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corrupt—not even a scintilla and not even when they lead to federal
indictments for bribery.
Part III
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
EXPENDITURES
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
The contribution limits the Supreme Court has upheld have all been
limits on contributions to candidates, parties, and other groups that have
either contributed money to candidates or coordinated their expenditures
with candidates. In three decisions, however, members of the Court and the
Court itself have spoken to the issue that the D.C. Circuit decided in
SpeechNow—the validity of limiting contributions to groups that make only
independent expenditures.
In California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 88 the Court upheld a limit on what a
medical association could contribute to a PAC that made both independent
expenditures and contributions to candidates—a conventional PAC, not a
super PAC. Four dissenting Justices would not have reached the issue; they
maintained that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
The other five Justices unanimously upheld the contribution limit, but
Justice Blackmun wrote in a concurring opinion that, if the PAC had been a
super PAC rather than a conventional PAC, he would have voted to strike
the limit down: “[A] different result would follow if [the contribution limit]
were applied to contributions to a political committee established for the
purpose of making independent expenditures, rather than contributions to
candidates.” 89
The other four Justices who reached the merits did not join Justice
Blackmun’s opinion, apparently because they took a different view. Buckley
had treated contributions as low-value speech partly because “the
transformation of contributions into political speech involves speech by
someone other than the contributor.” 90 The four-Justice plurality quoted this
language, italicizing the words “speech by someone other than the
contributor.” 91 It observed that, although the medical association had
created the PAC to which it contributed, the PAC’s speech was not the
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association’s, 92 and it declared, “‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not the sort of
political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First
Amendment protection.” 93 The plurality’s analysis was as applicable to
contributions to super PACs as it was to contributions to conventional PACs
and to candidates.
In Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado I), 94 the
Supreme Court struck down a limit on expenditures by a political party. The
principal opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O’Connor and
Souter, 95 concluded that these expenditures were not coordinated with those
of any candidate. The opinion recognized, however, that, by contributing to
an independent expenditure group like the party, donors could evade the
limits on contributions to candidates. Justice Breyer accordingly had no
doubt that limits on contributions to independent expenditure groups were
valid:
The greatest danger of corruption . . . appears to be from the
ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may
be used for independent . . . expenditures for the benefit of a
particular candidate. We could understand how Congress, were it
to conclude that the potential for evasion of the individual
contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to change
the statute’s limitations on contributions to political parties. But
we do not believe that the risk of corruption present here could
justify the “markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused
by” the statute’s limitations on expenditures. 96
In a third case, McConnell v. FEC, 97 the Court summarized and
criticized the position taken by Justice Kennedy in dissent. Justice
Kennedy’s view, according to the Court, was that Congress may limit only
“contributions made directly to, contributions made at the behest of, and
expenditures make in coordination with, a federal officeholder or
candidate.” 98 This view would block Congress from limiting contributions
to super PACs unless these contributions were made at the behest of a
candidate. The Court, however, rejected Justice Kennedy’s position, calling
92
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it “crabbed” and declaring that it ignored “precedent, common sense, and
the realities of political fundraising.” 99 In the course of its discussion, the
Court observed in a footnote that Congress could validly limit contributions
made for purpose of funding “express advocacy and numerous other
noncoordinated expenditures.” 100
B. ARE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPER PACS REALLY CONTRIBUTIONS?
Although most of the Supreme Court Justices who have considered the
constitutionality of limiting contributions to super PACs have rejected the
D.C. Circuit’s position and although the Court itself rejected that position in
McConnell’s footnote dictum, 101 it would be consistent with the Court’s
decisions to distinguish contributions to candidates and groups linked to
candidates from all other forms of campaign financing. Perhaps, when some
Justices have spoken of contributions, they have meant only contributions to
candidates and groups whose spending candidates can influence. When a
group’s expenditures are coordinated with those of a candidate, the
expenditures become contributions to the candidate. 102 And if expenditures
become contributions when they are “coordinated,” perhaps contributions
become expenditures when they are “uncoordinated”—when no candidate
influences how they are spent. Concluding that contributions to super PACs
are not truly contributions—that they are in fact expenditures—would
provide an alternate basis for the ruling in SpeechNow. 103
If the distinction between contributions and expenditures rested on the
proposition that candidates cannot be corrupted by funds given to and spent
by others, this alternate rationale for SpeechNow would make sense. That
proposition, however, is plainly false, and it was not in fact the basis for the
Supreme Court’s distinction. If it were true, someone would need to tell
former Alabama governor Don Siegelman, who recently spent more than six
years in federal prison for bribery. 104 Siegelman allegedly appointed
99
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someone to a state board in return for a contribution to a group supporting a
referendum he favored, a contribution that did not benefit him personally. 105
As this Article noted in its discussion of the charges against Senator
Menendez and Dr. Melgen, an official cannot avoid a charge of corruption
by saying, “Please pay the money to the Red Cross or my alter-ego super
PAC.” 106
In Buckley, the Supreme Court did not endorse the untenable view that
candidates cannot be corrupted by money paid to and spent by others.
Instead it noted several differences between contributions and expenditures.
(One difference, to be sure, was that money given to a candidate tends to be
more corrupting than money spent on his behalf by someone else.)
The Court offered three reasons for concluding that direct contributions
have less communicative value than independent expenditures and two
reasons for concluding that contributions are more corrupting. An
examination of these reasons reveals that contributions to super PACs are
indeed contributions, not expenditures. These contributions cannot
reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates whose
limitation Buckley upheld.
C. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONS FOR TREATING CONTRIBUTIONS AS
LOW-VALUE SPEECH
All of Buckley’s reasons for treating contributions as low-value speech
apply fully to contributions to super PACs.
First, the Court said, “A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not convey the underlying
basis for that support.” 107 Equally, a contribution to a super PAC does not
convey the underlying basis for the contributor’s support.
Second, the Court said, “the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 108
Transforming a contribution to a super PAC into political debate also
“involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”
Third, the Court said, limiting the amount of an individual’s
contribution “permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics/southunionstreet/2017/02/08/fo
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that a candidate-election contribution does”).
106
See Part IIA supra.
107
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
108
Id.
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contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to
discuss candidates and issues.” 109 Again contributions to super PACs are no
different. Limiting a contribution to a super PAC allows the contribution to
serve as an expression of support but does not limit a contributor’s freedom
to discuss candidates and issues.
The strongest of the Court’s reasons for treating contributions as lowvalue speech was probably its observation that transforming contributions
into debate “involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”
Although Buckley rejected the bumper-sticker view that “money is not
speech,” 110 it recognized that writing a check is not entitled to the same
First Amendment protection as actually speaking. The four-Justice plurality
in California Medical Ass’n v. FEC 111 saw this passage of the Buckley
opinion as crucial. Their opinion declared, “‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not
the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full
First Amendment protection.” 112
The Supreme Court’s refusal to subject contribution limits to strict
scrutiny rested on its conclusion that contributions have limited
communicative value. Although the Court discussed the strength of the
government’s anticorruption interest as well, the intensity of this interest
bears on whether a contribution or expenditure limit satisfies strict scrutiny
or some other standard, not what the standard should be. As the Court
explained in FEC v. Beaumont, 113
[T]he level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the “political
109

Id.
Id. at 15-17. The Court noted that one cannot publish a newspaper or send a
telegram without spending money. Justice Alito has called it “very frustrating” for a
Supreme Court opinion to be “reduced to a slogan that you put on a bumper sticker.”
LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 96 (2014).
111
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
112
Id. at 196.
The weakest of the Court’s reasons for treating contributions as low-value speech was
its statement that a contribution limit “permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to
discuss candidates and issues.” The Court elaborated, “The quantity of the communication
by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the
expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.” Buckley, 424
U.S. at 21. A contributor might be surprised to learn that writing a check to a campaign for
the maximum permissible amount—a check for thousands of dollars—is merely “symbolic
support.” Contributions merit a degree of First Amendment protection, not only because
they are symbolic speech, but also and more importantly because they bring the political
speech of others to an audience. The larger the contribution, the more speech it is likely to
facilitate (as well as the more illegitimate influence it is likely to have).
113
539 U.S. 146 (2003).
110
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activity at issue” to effective speech or political association. . . .
[R]estrictions on political contributions have been treated as
merely “marginal” speech restrictions subject to relatively
complaisant review under the First Amendment, because
contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political
expression. 114
Contributions to super PACs have no greater communicative value than
contributions to candidates. Like contributions to candidates, these
contributions differ from expenditures and “lie closer to the edges than to
the core of political expression.”
D. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONS FOR TREATING CONTRIBUTIONS AS
MORE CORRUPTING THAN EXPENDITURES
In addition to its three reasons for treating contributions to candidates as
low-value speech, Buckley offered two reasons for viewing these
contributions as more corrupting than independent expenditures. First, it
said, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.” 115 Second, the Court said that independent expenditures tend to
be less valuable to candidates. It wrote, “[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does
not presently appear to pose any dangers of real or apparent corruption
comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.” 116
Moreover, “independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to
the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.” 117
The rules forbidding the coordination of a super PAC’s expenditures
with those of a candidate limit what advice candidates can give to super
PAC managers, but they do not limit what candidates can say to super PAC
donors. If candidates wish to tell donors how they wish super PAC funds to
be spent, they may do so freely, as long as the donors do not then act as the
candidates’ agents by conveying their wishes to the people who will
actually determine how the funds are spent. 118 And if candidates wish to
advise donors how the donors’ own funds should be spent—namely, by
donating them to the super PAC—again they may do so within limits. 119
114

Id. at 161.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
116
Id. at 46.
117
Id.
118
See 11 CFR §§ 109.20(a), .21(a) (2016).
119
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2011-12 (June 30, 2011),
115
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The possibility of prearrangement and coordination does not distinguish
contributions to super PACs from contributions to candidates.
Buckley’s claim that the absence of prearrangement and coordination
reduces the likelihood of improper commitments by candidates is
unconvincing in any event. People willing to violate the law against bribery
are usually willing to violate the law forbidding the coordination of
electoral expenditures as well. Neither law bars a candidate from meeting
with supporters, and when a candidate and a supporter have lunch, they may
whisper about coordinating expenditures, bribes, and, if they like, robbing
banks. It is difficult to see how the law forbidding the coordination of
electoral expenditures reduces the likelihood of bribery in the slightest. 120
The more important of Buckley’s reasons for regarding independent
expenditures as less corrupting than contributions was that expenditures
usually have less value to a candidate. Buckley’s approval of this reason,
however, was tentative: “[I]ndependent advocacy . . . does not presently
appear to pose any dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to
those identified with large campaign contributions.” 121 “[I]ndependent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign
and indeed may prove counterproductive.” 122
Experience in the years since Buckley has called the Court’s provisional
judgment into question. When Buckley noted that independent expenditures
might provide little assistance to a candidate and might prove
counterproductive, the Court probably did not foresee super PACs that
spend more than the candidates they support, 123 that are managed by
candidates’ former campaign managers and other experienced political
operatives, 124 and that may be ceded responsibility for all of a campaign’s
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202011-12-pdf. Even if one were to envision contributions
to super PACs as expenditures rather than contributions, one could not regard them as
independent expenditures, for federal law allows candidates to encourage donors to make
these expenditures.
120
To put the point differently: Buckley maintained that people who observe the law
restricting the coordination of electoral expenditures will have limited opportunities to
engage in bribery. But if one is willing to assume that people obey the law forbidding the
coordination of expenditures, this person should also assume that they obey the law against
bribery. And, if people obey the law against bribery, the problem vanishes. People who
obey the law forbidding coordinated expenditures may have limited opportunities to
engage in bribery, but people who obey the law against bribery do not engage in bribery at
all.
121
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
122
Id. (emphasis added).
123
See Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure, note supra, at 1484
(“Super PACs are often able to outspend the candidates they support . . . .”).
124
See Alschuler, note supra, at 394 & n.23 (noting that the managers of Restore Our
Future, the principal super PAC supporting Governor Romney’s 2012 presidential
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advertising. 125 The Court’s judgment that, other things being equal, a
candidate would prefer to control campaign expenditures himself is no
doubt sound, but post-Buckley experience has suggested that other things
often are not equal. There is a strong advantage to having messages sent on
one’s behalf for which one need take no responsibility.
Without examining post-Buckley experience and without knowing what
super PACs would become, Citizens United settled by fiat the empirical
question Buckley left open. After declaring the anticorruption interest
insufficient to justify any restriction of independent expenditures, 126 it made
the sweeping pronouncement that has been the focus of much of this
Article: “[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 127
Perhaps, as Buckley tentatively postulated and as Citizens United
proclaimed, independent expenditures are less corrupting than direct
contributions to candidates. Of the five reasons Buckley offered for
distinguishing independent expenditures from contributions, only this last
one may also distinguish contributions to super PACs from contributions to
candidates. A candidate may value a $5500 contribution to a super PAC
urging his election less than a $5500 contribution to his own campaign.
But how much less? In a post-Citizens United decision, McCutcheon v.
FEC, 128 four members of the Citizens United majority joined a plurality
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts. This opinion reiterated Buckley’s
statement that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate” and then acknowledged, “But probably not by
95 percent.” 129 Similarly, a candidate might value a $5500 contribution to a
super PAC less than a $5500 contribution to his own campaign, but
“probably not by 95 percent.” A $1 million super PAC contribution
produces vastly more corruption and/or appearance of corruption than a
$5500 campaign contribution can yield. If Congress may prohibit the
campaign contribution (as it may and has), it should be allowed to prohibit
campaign, included the political director of Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign and the
counsel and chief financial officer of Romney’s 2008 campaign—and that Priorities USA
Action, the principal super PAC supporting President Obama, was also managed by people
close to him).
125
See As Bush Campaign Goes Down, Knives Come Out, NPR, Feb. 23, 2016,
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/23/467745559/where-did-all-that-jeb-bush-superpac-moneygo (noting that the official campaign committee for presidential candidate Jeb Bush
“essentially outsourced its media operation to the supposedly independent superPAC”).
126
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
127
Id.
128
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
129
Id. at 1454.
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the super PAC contribution as well. If Buckley still stands (and Citizens
United says it does), SpeechNow was wrongly decided. Contributions to
super PACs cannot reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to
candidates whose limitation Buckley upheld.
E. WHY CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES ARE NOT FUNGIBLE: THE
FALSE ALLURE OF THE HYDRAULIC HYPOTHESIS
One might suppose that, if wealthy people could not contribute
unlimited sums to super PACs, they would use the same funds to make
independent expenditures. They would substitute fully protected “speech”
for “speech by proxy.” But they probably wouldn’t.
Some skeptics have embraced what one might call the hydraulic
hypothesis. As the Supreme Court itself once declared, “Money, like water,
will always find an outlet.” 130 The proponents of this hypothesis, however,
have offered little evidence to support it. 131 If it were true, SpeechNow
could not have changed the world. Before SpeechNow, the people who now
make multi-million contributions to super PACs would have made multimillion-dollar independent expenditures instead. Million-dollar independent
expenditures by people other than candidates, however, seem to have been
extremely rare. Indeed, we know of none at all. 132 After SpeechNow, “large
130
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003); see FEC v. National Conservative
Pol. Action Com., 470 U.S. 480, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (confessing that
Justice Marshall erred in Buckley when he endorsed the distinction between contributions
and expenditures because, in his view, when the ability to make direct contributions is
limited, people “will find other ways to benefit the candidate’s campaign”); Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[P]olitical money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never
really disappears into thin air.”).
131
See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 79 (1998) (“Most [interest
groups] have shown little interest in getting around contribution limits”). Although most
interest groups seem not to take advantage of loopholes and workarounds, Malbin and Gais
show that many groups do. Loopholes and workarounds matter, and we certainly do not
propose ignoring them. We question only the hypothesis that donors always find a
workaround so that contribution limits become futile. We note in addition that large
independent expenditures by individuals are an especially unattractive and unlikely
workaround.
132
Candidates did sometimes fund their own campaigns, but, as Buckley noted, a
candidate who makes expenditures on his own behalf does not corrupt himself. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54.
Independent expenditures provided one lawful way around contribution limits prior to
SpeechNow, and donations to 527, 501(c)(4), and 501(c)(6) groups provided others. See 26
U.S.C. § 527, 501(c)(4), 501(c)(6). Donations to these groups, however, were less effective
than direct contributions to candidates both in bringing messages to the public and in
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contributions by individuals . . . skyrocketed.” 133
Just as wealthy people apparently did not make large independent
political expenditures before SpeechNow, they would be very unlikely to
make these expenditures if the pre-SpeechNow regime were restored.
Spending millions of political dollars effectively requires an organization,
one employing people with a variety of skills. If a wealthy person were to
establish such an organization as distinct legal entity, this organization
would be called a super PAC. A person who funded this organization would
engage in “speech by proxy,” and his contribution could be limited.
A wealthy person might employ a personal staff to aid him in making
independent expenditures as an individual. He then would be liable for the
torts and breaches of contract committed by staff members in the course of
their employment; he would be required to take personal responsibility for
the advertisements they placed (“I’m Bobby Billionaire, and I approved this
message.”); and one of the dubious things Buckley said about independent
expenditures might become true: “Unlike contributions, . . . independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign
and indeed may prove counterproductive.” 134 Even if this person could find
and employ capable managers, the enterprise would require his personal
attention. We suspect that few of the billionaires willing to write large
checks to super PACs are willing to manage political organizations
themselves.
Contributions to super PACs have advantages over independent
expenditures apart from the fact that they save contributors from the need to
manage political organizations and take personal responsibility for the
messages they send. An early contribution to a super PAC ensures that
funds will be available throughout a campaign. A promise to make
independent expenditures throughout a campaign is less reliable. The
independent spender’s promise may not be kept, especially if the benefitted
candidacy starts to founder. Moreover, a contributor may feel freer to
discuss policy (i.e., what he wants) with a candidate after making a
contribution to a super PAC than he would if he were making continuing
expenditures on the candidate’s behalf. When an irrevocable donation
precedes an “ask,” the donation is not conditioned on receiving the desired
response, and criminal prosecution becomes less likely. 135
buying clout. See Alschuler, supra note , at 455-56. Moreover, rejecting SpeechNow would
restore Congress’s authority to curb these workarounds.
133
Alschuler, supra note , at 423.
134
Buckley, 427 U.S. at 47.
135
But see Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of
Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 479-82 (2015) (discussing “stream
of benefits” or “course of conduct” bribery).
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Part IV
THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION
A. WEALTH DISPARITY, MISTRUST, AND CORRUPTION
[S]ocial trust is a social good to be
protected . . . . When it is damaged, the
community as a whole suffers; and when it
is destroyed, societies falter and collapse.
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE
AND PRIVATE LIFE 27 (1978).

IN

PUBLIC

For more than forty years, the Supreme Court has held that Congress
may restrict political contributions to prevent corruption and the appearance
of corruption. This Section examines the appearance of corruption that
unlimited super PAC contributions have produced. The material it presents
should be viewed against the background of America’s large and growing
disparity in the distribution of wealth and the lack of social trust that
invariably accompanies a high level of economic inequality.
In 2011, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz published
an influential article titled “Of the 1%, By the 1%, For the 1%.” 136 Here’s
how it began:
It’s no use pretending that what has obviously happened has not
in fact happened. The upper 1 percent of Americans are now
taking in nearly a quarter of the nation’s income every year. In
terms of wealth rather than income, the top 1 percent control 40
percent. Their lot in life has improved considerably. Twenty-five
years ago, the corresponding figures were 12 percent and 33
percent. . . . While the top 1 percent have seen their incomes rise
18 percent over the past decade, those in the middle have actually
seen their incomes fall. For men with only high-school degrees,
the decline has been precipitous—12 percent in the last quartercentury alone. All the growth in recent decades—and more—has
gone to those at the top. In terms of income equality, America
lags behind [every] country in . . . Europe . . . . [T]he vast
inequalities that seemed so troubling in the mid-19th century . . .
136

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, By the 1%, For the 1%, Vanity Fair, Mar. 31, 2011,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105.
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are but a pale shadow of what we are seeing in America today. 137
Some additional data:

137

•

Although the richest 1% of Americans currently receive over
20% of all income (slightly more than the top 1% did in the era
of Rockefeller and Carnegie), they received only 10% in the
decades from 1950 to 1980. 138 A “great compression” occurred
mostly during World War II, and it produced a “middle class
society” that endured for three decades. 139 Among the possible
causes of increased inequality since then have been less
progressive taxation, less powerful labor unions, an increased
number of women entering the workforce at low wages, a
minimum wage that lagged behind inflation, the export of
manufacturing jobs, increased international trade, and
technological change. In recent decades, top managers and
shareholders have captured nearly all gains from increased
productivity and trade. 140

•

The net worth of America’s wealthiest 400 individuals exceeds
the net worth of half of all American households. 141

Id. Stiglitz’s article observed that popular protests were occurring throughout the
world in places where a small fraction of the population controlled most of the wealth and
where corruption had become a way of life. He wrote, “As we gaze out at the popular
fervor in the streets, one question to ask ourselves is this: When will it come to America?”
Id.
138
See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the
United States (updated with 2013 preliminary estimates) at Figure 2 (2015),
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf.
139
See Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage
Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 107 (1992).
140
See Causes of Income Inequality in the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
(last
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_income_inequality_in_the_United_States
visited May 29, 2017).
141
Politifact Wisconsin reviewed the relevant sources and spoke with several respected
economists after filmmaker Michael Moore made this claim, and it rated the claim True.
For its review of the sources, see Tom Kertscher, Michael Moore Says 400 Americans
Have More Wealth than Half of All Americans Combined, POLITIFACT WISCONSIN, Mar.
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2011/mar/10/michael10,
2011,
moore/michael-moore-says-400-americans-have-more-wealth-/.
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•

The six heirs of Wal-Mart’s founder have as much wealth as the
bottom 41.5% of all Americans. 142

•

Fifty years ago, the average compensation of the CEOs of the
largest U.S. firms was twenty times greater than that of the
average worker. It is more than 300 times greater today. 143

•

The United States is “the most unequal rich country on earth”
not only because its rich are especially rich but also because,
among developed countries, its poor are especially poor. 144

Social trust is strongly correlated with equality in the distribution of
wealth. This trust is typically measured by responses to the survey question,
“Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” 145 In the nations in which
social trust is highest, more than 60% of respondents say that most people
can be trusted. These nations are the most equal in the distribution of
wealth—places like Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In the nations in which
social trust is lowest, fewer than 10% say that most people can be trusted.
These nations are among the least equal—places like Columbia, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Peru. 146 Studies employing multivariate analysis in various
142

Again, Politifact Wisconsin did impressive research after an advocacy group made
this claim, and it rated the claim True. Tom Kertscher, Just How Wealthy is the Wal-Mart
WISCONSIN,
Dec.
8,
2013,
Walton
Family?,
POLITIFACT
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2013/dec/08/one-wisconsin-now/just-howwealthy-wal-mart-walton-family/.
143
Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More than Typical
Workers
(Economic
Policy
Institute
Issue
Brief
#399)
(2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/top-ceos-make-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growthsurpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-of-the-0-1-percent/; see Executive Paywatch, AFLCIO, https://aflcio.org/paywatch (reporting that the average compensation of the CEO’s of
S&P 500 Index companies was 347 times greater than the compensation of the average
American worker).
144
Jonathan Fisher & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS: SPECIAL
ISSUE: THE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY REPORT 2016 at 32, 34, 36 (The Stanford Center on
Poverty and Inequality 2016), http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/PathwaysSOTU-2016.pdf. The poorest 10% of the U.S. population has more real income per capita
than the poorest 10% in Italy, but it has less per capita income than the poorest 10% in
Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Id. at 34.
145
See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS AND SOCIAL TRUST: WHO, WHERE,
AND WHY 2 (2007), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/SocialTrust.pdf.
146
See ESTEBAN ORTIZ-OSPINA & MAX ROSER, TRUST (2016) (published online at
OurWorldinData.org), https://ourworldindata.org/trust (describing levels of trust); Richard
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settings confirm what the raw figures suggest—that economic inequality is a
strong predictor of mistrust. 147
Studies of changing attitudes over time show the same pattern as studies
of geographical variation. As wealth disparities increased in America, the
proportion of Americans who believe that most people can be trusted fell—
from 46% in 1972-74 to 33% in 2010-12. 148 Trust levels are positively
correlated with wealth as well as with equality, but the United States now
departs from the pattern. Although the U.S. ranks high among developed
nations in median household income, it ranks low among these nations in
social trust. 149
Trust is a major component of what economists, sociologists, and
political scientists call social capital. The political scientist Eric Uslander
explains:
Trust is the chicken soup of social life. It reputedly brings us all
sorts of good things—from a willingness to get involved in our
communities to higher rates of economic growth, to satisfaction
with government performance, to making daily life more pleasant.
. . . An active and engaged citizenry is motivated by a shared
sense of common purpose that ultimately helps people find
compromises to difficult issues. 150
Resentment of “the one percent” by a significant part of “the ninety-nine
percent” may rest partly on jealousy of their mansions, but our guess is that
it stems much more from the perception that “the one percent” have bought
government favors and made government less democratic. The $2.7 million
electric train set in Robert Mercer’s basement probably troubles people less
than the perception that “Mercer has surrounded [President Trump] with his
Wilkinson,
How
Economic
Inequality
Harms
Societies,
TED
(2011),
https://www.ted.com/talks/richard_wilkinson/transcript (describing the correlation between
trust and levels of economic inequality).
147
See Henrik Jordahl, Inequality and Trust at 17 (Research Institution of Industrial
Economics 2007), http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp715.pdf (reviewing the empirical
literature and declaring that the “relationship shows up consistently in different studies,
although in a few of them it is not statistically significant”); Bo Rothstein & Eric M.
Uslaner, All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust, 58 WORLD POLITICS 41
(2005).
148
Jean M. Twenge et al., Trust in Others and Confidence in Institutions Among
American Adults and Late Adolescents, 1972-2012, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1914, 1916 (2014).
149
Lila Shapiro, Money and Trust: Richer, More Equal Countries Are More Trusting,
Study Finds, HUFF. POST, Jun. 20, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/20/trustwealth_n_851519.html.
150
Eric M. Uslander, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 569
(2000-2001).
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people, and his people have an outsized influence over the running of our
country, simply because Robert Mercer paid for their seats.” 151
As trust in other people has declined, trust in government has too. The
percentage of Americans who believed they could trust the federal
government most of the time was 77% in 1964. It is 19% today. 152 In 1964,
only 29% of respondents said that the government was “pretty much run by
a few big interests looking out for themselves.” Now more than threequarters take that view. 153 The perceived capture of government by a
wealthy minority contributes to the belief that the system of economic
distribution is unfair. Middle-income Americans may bristle at revelations
that many of the super-rich pay taxes at a lower rate than they do 154 and that
the federal program for providing medical care to seniors is prohibited by
law from seeking lower drug prices. 155
Government corruption—broadly defined as the capture of government
by special interests 156—seems to make everyone angry, from the Tea Party
through the Occupy Movement. Other than opposition to terrorism,
corruption may be the only issue that unites all of America. 157
151

David M. Magerman, The Oligarchy of the 0.001 Percenters, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER,
March
1,
2017,
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inqphillydeals/Billionaires_and_Democracy_Magerman_Mercer_Renaissance_Trump_Banno
n_Conway.html (op-ed by an executive of Robert Mercer’s hedge fund); see Jane Mayer,
The Reclusive Hedge-Fund Tycoon Behind the Trump Presidency: How Robert Mercer
Exploited America’s Populist Insurgency, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 2017,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/the-reclusive-hedge-fund-tycoonbehind-the-trump-presidency.
152
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR
GOVERNMENT: TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, 1958-2015 (2015), http://www.peoplepress.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/.
153
Id.
154
See, e.g., Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html
(“[W]hat I paid was only 17.4 percent of my taxable income—and that’s actually a lower
percentage than was paid by any of the other 20 people in our office . . . . My friends and I
have been coddled long enough by a billionaire-friendly Congress.”).
155
See Theodore T. Lee et al., The Politics of Medicare and Drug-Price Negotiation
AFFAIRS
BLOG,
Sept.
19,
2016,
(Updated),
HEALTH
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/09/19/the-politics-of-medicare-and-drug-pricenegotiation/.
156
See ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 114 (Benjamin Jowett, trans. 1920) (“The true forms of
government . . . are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to
the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest . . . are
perversions.”).
157
Cf. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (2014) (“When
the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income, . . . capitalism
automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine
the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”).
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A 2012 Gallup survey found that 87% of Americans regard “reducing
corruption in the federal government” as either extremely important or very
important, placing this goal slightly behind “creating good jobs” but ahead
of dealing with terrorism and other international threats, reducing the federal
budget deficit, ensuring the long-term stability of Social Security and
Medicare, improving the nation’s public schools, making health care
available and affordable, overcoming political gridlock, making college
education available and affordable, and dealing with environmental
concerns such as global warming. 158 A 2015 Gallup survey reported that
75% of Americans view government corruption as “widespread,” an
increase from 67% in 2007. 159
Empirical studies validate the belief that our government responds more
to the agendas of wealthy elites than to the desires of the majority. Martin
Gilens and Benjamin Page write:
In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not
rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining
policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with
economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. . .
. [E]ven when fairly large majorities favor policy change, they
generally do not get it. 160
Many other studies have made similar findings. 161
158

Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Want Next President to Prioritize Jobs, Corruption,
GALLUP, July 30, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/156347/Americans-Next-PresidentPrioritize-Jobs-Corruption.aspx.
159
75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP, Sept. 19, 2015,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx.
A Chapman University survey in 2015 found that more Americans were afraid or very
afraid of government corruption than were afraid of terrorist attacks, cyber terrorism, biowarfare, or economic collapse. Sheri Ledbetter, What Americans Fear Most—Chapman
University’s Second Annual Survey of American Fears Released, Chapman University
Press Room, Oct. 13, 2015, https://blogs.chapman.edu/press-room/2015/10/13/whatamericans-fear-most-chapman-universitys-second-annual-survey-of-american-fearsreleased/.
160
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 564, 576 (2014). See
also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with our Analysis of U.S. Political
Inequality: Here are 5 Ways They’re Wrong, WASH. POST, May 23, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-ourportrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-arewrong/?utm_term=.c28236371254.
161
See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012); JACOB S. HACKER &
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B. DEFINING CORRUPTION AND THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION
Citizens United took a narrow view of corruption. The Supreme Court
declared, “When Buckley identified a sufficiently important interest in
preventing corruption of the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quid pro quo corruption.” 162 The Court said that “[i]ngratiation
and access . . . are not corruption,” 163 and “[t]he fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these
officials are corrupt.” 164 In fact, “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be
covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved.” 165
Four Supreme Court Justices have called these statements dicta, 166 and
if the holding of Citizens United was that “the Government cannot restrict
political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,” 167 these Justices
were correct. None of the Court’s statements concerning cognizable
corruption advanced the Court’s holding in any way.
Nevertheless, in the discussion that follows, we accept all of the Court’s
dicta but one. When we say that super PAC contributions create the
appearance of corruption, we mean quid pro quo corruption, and we do not
include ingratiation and access. We balk, however, at Citizens United’s
indication that Congress may limit political contributions and expenditures
only to prevent criminal bribery or the appearance of this bribery.
Like several other broad declarations in the Citizens United opinion, 168
the statement that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by
bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved” probably was not
meant literally. Justice Kennedy might not have had the definition of
criminal bribery precisely in mind when he wrote those words, and he might
not have meant to bind Congress’s regulatory power tightly to this narrow,
PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH
RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010); KAY LEHMAN
SCHLOZMAN, ET. AL, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE
BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2012); Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin
Page, Who Influences Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POLY SCI. REV. 107 (2005); Elizabeth
Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in American
States, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552 (2013).
162
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
163
Id. at 360.
164
Id. at 359.
165
Id. at 356.
166
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1471 (2014) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
167
Id. at 346.
168
See Part IIC supra.
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contestable definition of a crime. In McCormick v. United States, 169 the
Supreme Court held that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes
only when “the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.” 170
In fact, Justice Kennedy himself criticized the Court’s requirement of an
“explicit” quid pro quo one year after McCormick. He wrote in a concurring
opinion that a public official and his benefactor “need not state the quid pro
quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by
knowing winks and nods.” 171 It seems unlikely that Citizens United meant
to exclude from the category of quid pro quo corruption conduct that Justice
Kennedy would treat as felonious.
Moreover, Citizens United purported to follow Buckley, which spoke,
not of bribes, but of “undue influence,” 172 “improper influence,” 173 and
“post-election special favors.” 174 Buckley in fact rejected the argument that
“contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and
narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means
of dealing with ‘proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.’” 175 The
Court explained, “[L]aws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes
deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to
influence government action.” 176 Buckley upheld contribution limits, not
because they prevented bribery “arrangements” that might be difficult to
prove, but because they blocked influences less “blatant and specific” than
bribes. The Court in fact pointed to several “deeply disturbing examples” of
what it called quid pro quo corruption, and none of them involved
169

500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Id. at 273. Although the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that a later Supreme Court
decision modified McCormick, see United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th
Cir. 2011) (discussing Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)), at least seven other
courts of appeals insist that an explicit agreement remains necessary. See United States v.
Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 25354, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 256-61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Abbey, 560
F.3d 513, 515-19 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009).
171
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a
defense of McCormick’s “explicit” quid pro quo requirement, see Alschuler, Criminal
Corruption, supra note , at 482-84.
172
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53, 70, 76.
173
Id. at 29, 30, 45, 58, 96.
174
Id. at 67. Taken literally, the Court’s statement that “[t]he practices Buckley noted
would be covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved” was a
statement of fact, and the factual statement was false.
175
Id. at 27.
176
Id. at 27-28.
170

37

LIMITING SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 8, 2017]

bribery. 177
Post-Buckley decisions were equally clear. The Court wrote in 2000 that
its concern was “not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[ed] to
the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
contributors.” 178 A year later it declared that corruption must be “understood
not only as quid pro quo arrangements, but also as undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment.” 179 Three years later, the Court wrote, “Congress’
legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes
corruption to curbing ‘undue influence.’” 180 The Court added that it was
“not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for . . .
donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.” 181 An
unexplained one-sentence dictum should not cast into the void all of the
Court’s prior descriptions of cognizable corruption.
In fact, a post-Citizens United opinion joined by Justice Kennedy and
three other members of the Citizens United majority made clear that
cognizable corruption is broader than the “nothing but bribery” dictum

177

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. Immediately after noting that the integrity of “our
system of representative democracy” can be undermined by large contributions “given to
secure a political quid pro quo,” the Court wrote, “Although the scope of such pernicious
practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after
the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.” It then cited the
D.C. Circuit’s recitation of these examples in its own Buckley v. Valeo opinion. Id. at 27
n.28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 & nn. 36-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam)).
One of the illustrations to which the Supreme Court referred was “the revelation [of]
the extensive contributions by dairy organizations to Nixon fund raisers, in order to gain a
meeting with White House officials on price supports.” 519 F.2d at 839 n.36. Another was
“lavish contributions by groups or individuals with special interests to legislators from both
parties, e.g., . . . by H. Ross Perot, whose company supplies data processing for Medicare
and Medicaid programs, to members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees.” Id. at 839 n.37. The third was the appointment of campaign contributors as
ambassadors, a practice whose “scale and volume” revealed a “widespread understanding
that such contributions were a means of obtaining the recognition needed to be actively
considered.” Id. at 840 n.38. The Buckley Court had no doubt of Congress’s power to limit
these “pernicious” and “deeply disturbing” practices.
178
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
179
FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)
(Colorado II).
180
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003). See also FEC v. National
Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“Corruption is a subversion of the political
process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”).
181
Id. at 145. Citizens United disapproved McConnell’s statement that Congress could
restrict political speech simply because the speaker was a corporation, but it did not
disapprove most of the McConnell opinion or reject McConnell’s definition of corruption.
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suggests. Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC 182
gave this explanation of why Buckley upheld contribution limits: “The
propriety of large contributions to individual candidates turned on the
subjective intent of donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way
to tell which donors sought improper influence over legislators’ actions.” 183
It would be difficult to improve on this description of Buckley’s
rationale. According to the McCutcheon plurality, seeking improper
influence justifies restricting campaign contributions. Moreover, because
there is no practical way to determine when this corrupt intent exists,
Congress may prohibit contributions large enough to pose a significant risk
of this improper motivation.
If, as the McCutcheon plurality recognized, deliberately seeking
improper influence is corrupt, so is deliberately providing it. Favoritism for
donors is not itself bribery. Every definition of criminal bribery requires
either a corrupt understanding or a corrupt mental state at the time a benefit
is received. None includes subsequent favoritism for a benefactor. 184 But
even when a payoff of government benefits has not been arranged in
advance, this payoff is corrupt. Using public dollars to repay private favors
is what Buckley meant when it spoke of quid pro quo corruption. Both
before and after Citizens United, the Supreme Court has treated this
corruption as sufficient to justify contribution limits. Despite Citizens
United’s confusing dictum, we adhere in the discussion that follows to the
Court’s longstanding view. 185
Buckley said that Congress may limit political contributions to prevent
not only corruption but also the appearance of corruption. 186 Although
“appearance” has myriad meanings, 187 the Court has left the term undefined
for more than forty years.
We think this term should be understood narrowly. The “appearance of
182

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1447.
184
See Alschuler, Criminal Corruption, supra note , at 481.
185
There are good reasons for not punishing deliberate favoritism as a crime. If an
official were subject to imprisonment whenever a jury could be persuaded that he acted
deliberately to benefit someone who once did a favor for him, only a fool would take the
job. The law of bribery accordingly requires a stronger inference—an inference that, at the
time an official accepted a benefit, he agreed at least implicitly to provide some
governmental action in return. Seeking to reduce deliberate favoritism through campaign
finance law and other specific ex ante regulation, however, does not threaten imprisonment
on the basis of ex post inferences of improper intent. There is no good reason for not
including this favoritism among the kinds of corruption that can justify ex ante regulation.
186
E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Service Comm. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
187
See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 1125 HARV. L. REV.
1563, 1573 (2012).
183
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corruption” is not “anything that smells a bit like corruption.” It is instead
“something that is believed or suspected to be corruption.” Of course the
suspected corruption must be of the kind that justifies regulation.
Moreover, an unreasonable belief in the existence of corruption cannot
justify limiting speech. The appropriate remedy for an unreasonable belief is
not limiting speech but “more speech.” 188 Thus the “appearance of
corruption” should be understood to mean “something that is reasonably
believed or suspected to be corruption” or “something that might in fact be
corruption of the sort that justifies regulation.”
Of course, as the McCutcheon plurality recognized, motives are often
mixed and rarely revealed, and inferences about particular situations and
particular actors are likely to be speculative and fallible. These inferences
may reflect an observer’s trust or cynicism as much as or more than they
reflect the actual motivations of public officials.
Consider an exchange that occurred at the Senate hearing on the
confirmation of Betsy DeVos to be Secretary of Education. When Senator
Bernie Sanders asked the nominee how much her family had contributed to
the Republican Party over the years, she replied that she did not know. She
conceded, however, that $200 million was “in the ballpark.” Sanders then
asked, “Do you think, if you were not a multi-billionaire, if your family had
not made hundreds of millions of dollars of contributions to the Republican
Party, that you would be sitting here today?” DeVos replied, “Senator, as a
matter of fact, I do think that there would be that possibility. I’ve worked
very hard on behalf of parents and children for the last almost 30 years . . .
.” 189
In the absence of DeVos’ family’s contributions, her nomination might
have been “possible” just as she said, but she could no more deny that these
contributions had prompted her nomination than Sanders could show that
they had done so. When the actions of elected officials benefit their
supporters (as of course they usually do), these actions may reflect policy or
principle rather than corruption. Even when officials give corrupt payoffs to
benefactors, however, they can almost always offer colorable public
explanations.
Although judgments about particular situations and particular actors are
often problematic, global assessments—or judgments of statistical
likelihood—can be easy. When favor-seekers make multi-million-dollar
188

See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Valerie Strauss, Sanders to DeVos: Would You be Trump’s Education Nominee if
You Weren’t a Billionaire?, WASH. POST ANSWER SHEET, Jan. 18, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/18/sanders-to-devoswould-you-be-trumps-education-nominee-if-you-werent-abillionaire/?utm_term=.2e27e4b78907.
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contributions to super PACs, one needs no more than a rudimentary
understanding of human nature to expect more than occasional corruption.
When elected officials then appear to advance the interests of wealthy
donors rather than the public, 190 the intuition seems confirmed. In
explaining why the appearance of corruption can justify limiting
contributions, Buckley noted the importance of the public’s perception of
government generally: “Congress could legitimately conclude that the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if
confidence in the system of representative government is not to be eroded to
a disastrous extent.’” 191
Although Buckley upheld Congress’s power to limit political
contributions, SpeechNow effectively abrogated it. Since then, Buckley’s
dark prophecy appears to have been fulfilled. Confidence in the system of
representative government has been “eroded to a disastrous extent.” The
following sections of this Article provide some evidence.
C. THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 2016
In the Democratic presidential primaries of 2016, Senator Bernie
Sanders received more than 12 million votes, 43% of the total. 192 Sanders’
refusal to accept any support from super PACs was a prominent feature of
his campaign. By the campaign’s end, audiences were chanting with him the
amount of the average contribution he received—$27. 193 He said of his
principal primary opponent, “Are you qualified to be President of the United
States when you’re raising millions of dollars from Wall Street whose greed,
recklessness and illegal behavior helped to destroy our economy?” 194
When Sanders announced his candidacy, he offered this view of the
corruption produced by unlimited political contributions: “[T]he American
political system has been totally corrupted, and the foundations of American
democracy are being undermined. What the Supreme Court essentially said
was that it was not good enough for the billionaire class to own much of our
190

See text at notes supra.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Service Comm. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
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economy. They could now own the U.S. government as well.” 195 Sanders
added, “We now have a political situation where billionaires are literally
able to buy elections and candidates. Let’s not kid ourselves: That is the
reality right now.” 196
The nominee of Democratic Party for President was former senator and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The principal super PAC supporting her
candidacy, Priorities USA Action, received donations of $1 million or more
from 77 individuals—and donations of $200,000 or more from 759
individuals. 197 Clinton nevertheless sharply criticized America’s system of
campaign finance. She promised to “fight hard to end the stranglehold that
the wealthy and special interests have on so much of our government,” 198 to
“appoint Supreme Court justices who will get money out of politics,” 199 and
“if necessary [to] pass a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens
United.” 200
The Republican Party’s nominee, developer Donald Trump, portrayed
himself as an “outsider” determined to “drain the swamp in Washington,
D.C.” 201 Although Trump later reconsidered, 202 he initially pledged, “I will
not be controlled by the donors, special interests, and lobbyists who have
corrupted our politics and politicians for far too long. I have disavowed all
Super PAC’s, requested the return of all donations made to said PAC’s, and
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I am calling on all Presidential candidates to do the same.” 203
Trump contended:
[I]t’s not just the political system that’s rigged. It’s the whole
economy. It’s rigged by donors who want to keep down wages.
It’s rigged by big businesses who want to leave our country, fire
our workers, and sell their products back to the U.S. with
absolutely no consequences for them. It’s rigged by bureaucrats
who are trapping kids in failing schools. It’s rigged against you,
the American people. 204
In a primary debate, Trump declared, “These Super PACs are a disaster
by the way, folks, very corrupt. . . . There is total control of the candidates. I
know it better than anybody that probably ever lived. . . . I know it so well
because I was on both sides of it. . . . I’ve always made large
contributions.” 205 He said of a Republican donor and a primary opponent,
“Sheldon Adelson is looking to give big dollars to Rubio because he feels he
can mold him into his perfect little puppet. I agree!” 206 He said of other
opponents, “I wish good luck to all of the Republican candidates who
traveled to California to beg for money, etc. from the Koch Brothers.

203
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Puppets?” 207
Trump called his Democratic opponent “Crooked Hillary,” 208 and he
addressed her roughly during the final debate of the campaign: “I sat there
watching ad after ad, false ad. All paid for by your friends on Wall Street
that gave you so much money because they know you’re going to protect
them.” 209
The Presidential campaign of 2016 revealed that the appearance of
corruption in America is widespread and intense. Unfettered super PAC
contributions have become, in the eyes of many, a potent symbol of
America’s deep corruption.
D. SOME VIEWS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS, LOBBYISTS, AND DONORS
Like presidential candidates, federal officeholders, lobbyists, and super
PAC donors have decried the corruption produced by America’s campaignfinance system. In 2015, former President Jimmy Carter said that America
has become
an oligarchy, with unlimited political bribery being the essence of
getting the nominations for president or to elect the president.
And the same thing applies to governors and U.S. senators and
congress members. So now we’ve just seen a complete subversion
of our political system as a payoff to major contributors, who
want and expect and sometimes get favors for themselves after the
election’s over. 210
Former Vice President Al Gore wrote in 2013, “American democracy
has been hacked. . . . The United States Congress . . . is now incapable of
passing laws without permission from the corporate lobbies and other
207
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special interests that control their campaign finances.” 211
Representative Michele Bachmann spoke in 2011 of “the corrupt
paradigm that has become Washington, D.C., whereby votes continually are
bought rather than representatives voting the will of their constituents.” 212
Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee for President in 2008,
said in 2012, “What we have done is make contributions limits a joke.” He
added, “I promise you there will be huge scandals, because there’s too much
money washing around, too much of it we don’t know who’s behind it and
too much corruption associated with that kind of money. There will be
major scandals.” 213
Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for President in 2004,
said in his last speech to the Senate before becoming Secretary of State in
2013, “The truth requires that we call the corrosion of money in politics
what it is—it is a form of corruption and it muzzles more Americans than it
empowers, and it is an imbalance that the world has taught us can only sow
the seeds of unrest.” 214
Senator Lindsay Graham said in 2015, “We’ve got to figure out a way
to fix this mess, because basically 50 people are running the whole
show.” 215
Senator Angus King said in 2016, “[W]e can look around the world
where oligarchs control the government, and we’re allowing that to happen
here before our very eyes.” 216
Senator Amy Klobuchar said in 2016, “This for me is the biggest issue
of our time in our country because I have seen what this money has done to
Washington.” 217
211
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Out of Politics, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionmoney-idUSKBN0N90SY20150418?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews.
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2016,
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Jack Abramoff, a former lobbyist who served a prison term for bribery,
said that, even apart from his illegal conduct, “I was participating in a
system of legalized bribery. All of it is bribery, every bit of it.” 218
Even some billionaire donors view unlimited super PAC contributions as
corrupting. Donald Sussman, who gave $39 million to Democratic super
PACs and allied groups in 2016, 219 told the Washington Post, “It’s very odd
to be giving millions when your objective is actually to get the money out of
politics.” 220 Sheldon Adelson, who gave $78 million to Republican super
PACs and allied groups in 2016, 221 told an interviewer, “I’m against very
wealthy people attempting to or influencing elections, but as long as it’s
doable I’m going to do it.” 222
E. PUBLIC OPINION
Opinion surveys also indicate the depth of the appearance of corruption
in America. 223 In a 2016 Rasmussen survey, 61% of likely voters agreed
Influence on Elections Loom Large, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/08/trump-clinton-sanders-super-pacselection-money.
218
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 8 (2011).
219
2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D (last visited June 20,
2017).
220
Matea Gold, Hedge Fund Manager S. Donald Sussman Gave $21 Million to ProClinton Super PAC Priorities USA, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/20/hedge-fund-managers-donald-sussman-gave-21-million-to-pro-clinton-super-pac-prioritiesusa/?utm_term=.d12a7a98fbb2.
221
2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D (last visited June 20,
2017).
222
Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says He Might Give $100M to Newt
Feb.
21,
2012,
Gingrich
Or
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FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionaire-sheldon-adelson-says-hemight-give-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/.
223
A Court that looks to the appearance of corruption as the test of Congress’s power
to limit political contributions cannot reasonably dismiss polls showing that this
appearance is pervasive. In other contexts, however, judges do not bend to opinion polls,
and the McCutcheon plurality declared that it would brave public opinion on campaign
finance issues as well:
Money in politics may at times seem repugnant to some, but so too does much
of what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the First Amendment
protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades—despite the profound
offense such spectacles cause—it surely protects political campaign speech
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that most members of Congress were “willing to sell their vote for either
cash or a campaign contribution.” The same percentage called it likely that
their own representatives had done so. 224
Fifty-four percent of the respondents to a 2012 Pew Research Center
survey described the United States government as “mostly corrupt.” 225
In a 2011 survey by the Center for Competitive Politics/Cooperative
Congressional Election Study, 59.2% of respondents agreed that a
contribution of $5,000 or more could exert a corrupting influence on a
candidate for Congress. 226
In a 2012 Democracy Corps/Public Campaign Action Fund survey,
59% of voters in 54 competitive congressional districts agreed that “[w]hen
someone gives 1 million dollars to a super PAC, they want something big in
return from the candidates they are trying to elect.” 227
A 2012 Brennan Center for Justice survey focused specifically on super
despite popular opposition.
134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion).
In our view, this passage reflects an error that has infected much of the Supreme
Court’s campaign-finance jurisprudence. The First Amendment protects Nazi parades and
other offensive speech, but the public does not oppose money in politics because it is
offended by the content of the messages this money may send—“vote Democratic” or
“vote Republican.” Rather, the public is troubled because campaign cash can persuade
elected officials in the same way that expense-paid trips to the Super Bowl can persuade
them, and persuasion of that kind is entitled to no First Amendment protection. We believe
that speech-facilitating activity should not be entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutional protection when the reason for limiting it is unrelated the message it
advances. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); John Hart Ely, Comment,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491–1502 (1975). Nevertheless, we leave
that proposition for another day and simply note that the McCutcheon plurality was not
entitled to claim the anti-censorship mantle of Milton, Mill, Holmes, and Brandeis.
Regulating political contributions and expenditures in an effort to prevent quid pro quo
corruption has little in common with suppressing unpopular speech.
224
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225
Growing Gap in Favorable Views of Federal, State Governments, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/4-26-12%20Govt%20Favorability.pdf.
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http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Public-Perception-and-theAppearance-of-Corruption-in-Campaign-Finance-Report-Final.pdf.
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47

LIMITING SUPER PAC CONTRIBUTIONS

[August 8, 2017]

PACs. It reported that 69% of respondents (74% of Republicans and 73% of
Democrats) agreed that “new rules that let corporations, unions and people
give unlimited money to Super PACs will lead to corruption.” Seventythree percent of respondents (75% of Republicans and 78% of Democrats)
agreed that “there would be less corruption if there were limits on how
much could be given to Super PACs.” Sixty-eight percent of respondents
(71% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans) agreed that “a company that
spent $100,000 to help elect a member of Congress could successfully
pressure him or her to change a vote on a proposed law.” 228
In a March 2012 ABC News/Washington Post survey, 69% of
respondents stated that super PACs should be illegal. 229
The Supreme Court said in Citizens United, “[T]he appearance of
influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this
democracy.” 230 Seven years after Citizens United and SpeechNow, however,
faith in our democracy appears to be at a nadir. The poling data reveal that
unlimited super PAC contributions have played a significant part in
intensifying public perceptions of corruption.
Part V
CHALLENGING SPEECHNOW
When a presidential candidate promises to appoint Supreme Court
justices who will overrule Citizens United, 231 her audience may imagine that
Citizens United would not last long if the candidate were elected and kept
her promise. Whenever a majority of the Court was prepared to overrule
Citizens United, someone would bring an appropriate case, and the decision
would vanish. The obstacles to bringing an appropriate case, however, are
substantial. Whatever its composition, the Supreme Court may not have an
228

National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, Apr. 24, 2012, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-superpacs-corruption-and-democracy (summary and appendix).
229
Damla Ergun, Seven in 10 Would Send Super PACs Packing, ABC NEWS, Mar. 13,
2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/seven-in-10-would-send-super-pacspacking/; Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/
postabcpoll_031012.html (question 33).
230
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314.
231
See Transcript, Hillary Clinton’s DNC Speech, Annotated, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-hillary-clinton-convention-speech2016,
transcript-20160728-snap-htmlstory.html. Of course popular rhetoric does not distinguish
between Citizens United and SpeechNow. Politicians and the public blame the Supreme
Court for everything.
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opportunity to overrule Citizens United.
Similarly, although the Court has not addressed the issue decided by
SpeechNow, it may never be able to do so. The authors of this Article are
among the lawyers currently representing members of Congress and
candidates for Congress who are attempting to bring this issue before the
Court. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is opposing their efforts on
grounds that, if successful, could keep the Court from ever deciding the
issue.
A court’s ability to reconsider a decision upholding a statute differs
from its ability to reconsider a decision striking a statute down. When a
court upholds a challenged statute, its ruling binds the party who has
challenged this statute, but someone else threatened with enforcement can
bring another challenge and ask the court to overrule its earlier decision. If
this party fails, a third party can bring a third challenge. The challengers of a
statute can keep trying until (because new judges are appointed or because
minds or circumstances change) victory is won. Citizens United, which
overruled two prior decisions upholding federal election laws, illustrates the
process. 232
Once a court holds a statute unconstitutional, however, enforcement of
the statute usually comes to a halt. Non-enforcement of the statute then
becomes an injury shared by all members of the public, and no one may
have standing to challenge it. 233 The law of standing may thus place
decisions about the constitutionality of statutes on a one-way ratchet. Any
triumph of a statute’s defenders may prove transient, but any triumph of a
challenger (even at the hands of a closely divided Supreme Court) may
prove permanent and incontestable. Constitutional litigation can become a
game of sudden death, but only for one side. Although a “presumption of
constitutionality” 234 is thought to tilt the game board against litigants who
challenge a statute’s constitutionality, the law of standing appears to tilt the
232

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-66 (overruling Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and a portion of McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003)).
233
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217
(1974) (denying standing to litigants who sought to assert “only the generalized interest of
all citizens in constitutional governance”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177
(1974) (denying standing because the injury asserted was “undifferentiated and ‘common
to all members of the public’”); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940)
(litigants must show injury to “a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the
public’s interest in the administration of the law”); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
488 (1923) (declaring it insufficient that a litigant “suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally”).
234
See, e.g., O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58
(1930).
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board in the opposite direction.
When the Justice Department failed to seek Supreme Court review of
the SpeechNow decision 235 and the FEC acquiesced in this decision, 236 the
enforcement of federal limits on super PAC contributions ceased. For a
time, several states and one municipality continued to enforce their own
limits, but the federal courts of appeals sustained challenges to their
efforts. 237 None of the states sought Supreme Court review, 238 and the
petition for certiorari filed by the municipality did not address the
SpeechNow syllogism the court of appeals had endorsed. Indeed, this
petition did not include SpeechNow among the five cases it cited. 239
With the denial of the municipality’s petition and the failure of the
states to seek review, the path to the Supreme Court seemed almost closed.
Nevertheless, John Bonifaz, the president of the public-interest organization
Free Speech For People; Ronald A. Fein, the group’s legal director; and
some volunteer lawyers including the authors of this Article sought ways to
bring the constitutionality of limiting super PAC contributions before the
Court.
235

See text at note supra.
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2010-11,
http://saos.fec.gov./aodocs/AO%202010-11pdf (Commonsense 10).
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See the decisions cited in note __ supra.
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See Letter from Brian A. Sutherland, Assistant Solicitor General of the State of
New York, to Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York, May 23, 2014 (on file with Professor Alschuler); email
from Jonathan Mitchell, Solicitor General of the State of Texas, to Albert Alschuler, Dec.
21, 2013 (on file with Professor Alschuler).
239
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, City of Long Beach v. Long Beach Area
Chamber of Commerce, 526 U.S. 896 (2010) (No. 10-155).
The Ninth Circuit argument on the validity of the Long Beach ordinance limiting super
PAC contributions occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United. After
Citizens United and before SpeechNow, the parties filed supplemental briefs on the
significance of Citizens United. The Ninth Circuit decided the case on April 30, 2010, a
little more than a month after the D.C. Circuit decided SpeechNow. Long Beach Area
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010). The court
quoted and relied on the SpeechNow syllogism. Id. at 697-98.
The Long Beach ordinance presented the validity of limiting contributions to super
PACs in a peculiar way. It did not directly impose any limit, and a contributor could not
violate the ordinance. The ordinance, however, forbade a super PAC that accepted
contributions in excess of certain specified amounts from making any expenditure. The
Ninth Circuit was uncertain whether this ordinance imposed contribution limits or an
expenditure limit, but it concluded that the SpeechNow syllogism made that issue
immaterial. Id. at 692-93, 697-98. The prevailing party in the Ninth Circuit did not respond
to the city’s petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court did not request a response. The
Court denied certiorari on the first day of its October 2010 Term, approximately eight
months after it decided Citizens United. City of Long Beach v. Long Beach Area Chamber
of Commerce, 526 U.S. 896 (2010).
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One potential route to Supreme Court review was the enactment of
legislation incompatible with the right declared by SpeechNow. A stream of
legislation following Roe v. Wade 240 had given the Court repeated
opportunities to overrule that decision. Defenders of post-Roe restrictions on
abortion could argue that these restrictions were consistent with Roe or, in
the alternative, that Roe should be overruled. Unlike Roe, however,
SpeechNow did not create a right whose boundaries were uncertain.
Legislatures can resist SpeechNow only by enacting and enforcing limits on
super PAC contributions similar to those the D.C. Circuit struck down.
Free Speech For People encourages legislatures to enact these limits,
especially in places where federal courts of appeals have not yet ruled on
their validity. Unlike some legislative efforts to limit abortion, these limits
would not defy the courts’ authority; they might instead enable the Supreme
Court to consider an issue it has not yet addressed.
In May 2017, the House of Representatives in Connecticut voted to
approve legislation limiting super PAC contributions, 241 but the legislative
session ended without action by the Senate. Legislation limiting super PAC
contributions is currently under consideration in Massachusetts. In June
2017, the St. Petersburg, Florida City Council voted five-to-three to consider
an ordinance limiting super PAC contributions drafted primarily by Mr.
Fein. The Council is expected to vote on this ordinance in September. 242
Federal election law pointed a second route to Supreme Court review.
Although the failure to enforce a statute is usually seen as an injury shared
by everyone and challengeable by no one, there are exceptions, and the 1974
statute establishing the FEC created one of these exceptions.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) as amended by
the 1974 statute and other enactments provides that anyone may complain to
the FEC about any violation of federal election law and that anyone
“aggrieved” by either the dismissal of his complaint or the failure of the
Commission to act within 120 days may secure a judicial ruling on whether
240
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the FEC’s action or inaction is “contrary to law.” 243
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may afford review in
accordance with these provisions when a complainant satisfies Article III
standing requirements. 244 The complainant must show among other things a
threat of “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the agency’s failure to
enforce the law. The “injury in fact” requirement imposed by Article III is
thought to be more demanding than the statutory requirement that the
complainant be a “party aggrieved.” 245
The ability of private parties to secure judicial enforcement of federal
election law is a crucial part of FECA’s enforcement mechanism. The
FECA provides that no more than three of the FEC’s six members may be
members of the same party. 246 Four must agree before the agency can act. 247
The agency is widely regarded as dysfunctional. 248 One current FEC
commissioner commented, “Congress set this place up to gridlock. This
agency is functioning as Congress intended.” 249 When the FEC fails to
enforce the law, however, citizens may go to court.
The people most clearly threatened with “injury in fact” by the FEC’s
acquiescence in SpeechNow and its failure to enforce the federal limits on
contributions to super PACs are candidates for federal office—especially
candidates opposed by super PACs that receive contributions above the
limit. Free Speech For People identified six elected officeholders and
candidates who wished to challenge the FEC’s failure to enforce the limit.
They were Representative Ted Lieu (D-Cal); Representative Walter Jones
(R-NC); Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Or); former state senator John Howe, a
243
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Enforcement
Agency,
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2011, http://www.politico.com/story/2011/12/the-fecs-healthy-ugly-discourse-070396.
249
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Goodman).
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Republican candidate for Congress in Minnesota; Michael Wager, a
Democratic candidate for Congress in Ohio; and Zephyr Teachout, a
Democratic candidate for Congress in New York. A number of lawyers
volunteered to work with Free Speech For People in representing these
complainants, including Anne Weismann, Stephen A. Weisbrod, Brad
Deutsch, Malcolm Seymour, Andrew Goodman, and us.
On July 7, 2016, with the general election campaigns of 2016 barely
underway, Representative Lieu and the others filed their complaint with the
FEC. 250 The FEC might have dismissed this complaint promptly, citing its
earlier acquiescence in SpeechNow. The complainants then could have
sought review in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. That
court, which was bound to follow SpeechNow, also might have denied relief
quickly. The complainants then could have appealed to the court of appeals
and urged it to overrule SpeechNow. The likelihood that the court of appeals
would overrule its unanimous en banc decision was small, however, and a
three-judge panel of the court would not have had authority to do so. 251 If
the court of appeals denied relief, the complainants could have sought
Supreme Court review. This four-tribunal path to review may look
straightforward, but in fact it is filled with booby-traps.
The statutory period of 120 days ended without an FEC ruling, and
little agency activity seems to have occurred within this period. The Lieu
complaint listed as respondents ten super PACs that had campaigned against
one or more of the complainants and that had accepted contributions above
the statutory limit. It noted 39 contributions above the limit from 27
contributors these super PACs had received. After receiving the complaint,
the FEC sent “notification letters” not only to the named respondents but
also to all of the contributors identified in the complaint. 252 Many of the
mostly well-known law firms representing the contributors and the super
PACs then sought extensions of time, and 22 ultimately filed responses to
the complaint. We imagine that these firms billed their clients thousands of
dollars to inform the FEC of something the FEC’s records and the clients’
own disclosures already revealed—that the clients did accept contributions
above the limit, just as SpeechNow and an FEC advisory opinion authorized
them to do. The statute provides that, although the FEC must notify
respondents that a complaint has been filed, it need not invite responses
before dismissing the complaint. 253
250

A copy of the complaint appears at https://freespeechforpeople.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/FINAL-FEC-Complaint-PDF-7-7-16.pdf.
251
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On November 4, 2016, four days before Election Day, the complainants
filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. They
alleged that the FEC’s failure to act within the statutory period was contrary
to law. 254
On reading the statute, one might have thought that the FEC’s failure to
act would be contrary to law if it had failed to enforce the law—in other
words, if it had not acted on a meritorious complaint within 120 days. This
straightforward reading of the statute would have allowed complainants to
seek judicial enforcement when the agency itself did not enforce the law
promptly. Congress apparently realized that, when the remedy for an
election-law violation comes after an election, it is likely to come too late. 255
In 1986, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected the view that the FEC’s
inaction can be contrary to law simply because the agency failed to enforce
the law. 256 It also declined to impose a requirement or even a presumption
that the FEC must rule on a complaint within a single election cycle. 257 The
court held that the agency’s failure to act on a complaint is contrary to law
only when its delay has been arbitrary and capricious. It added that a judge
should consider the resources available to the agency, the press of other
business, the complexity of the case, and other circumstances in determining
whether the agency’s delay has been arbitrary and capricious. 258
The FEC filed an answer to the complainants’ (now plaintiffs’) lawsuit.
It also sought and obtained a protective order to prevent the plaintiffs from
disclosing confidential information they might receive during the litigation.
It served interrogatories asking the plaintiffs to describe how they had been
injured by its non-enforcement of the limits on super PAC contributions.
The plaintiffs served interrogatories inquiring about the reasons for the
FEC’s delay and the actions it had taken since they filed their complaint.
On June 1, 2017, nearly eleven months after the plaintiffs filed their
administrative complaint, the FEC sent them a letter rejecting it. 259 After
receiving the letter, the plaintiffs moved to amend their district court
complaint to challenge the FEC’s rejection of their administrative
254
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complaint. The FEC opposed this motion, and, at the time of this writing,
the court has not ruled.
A plaintiff’s standing is ordinarily judged at the time a complaint is
filed. 260 By forcing the plaintiffs to re-file their complaint rather than amend
it, the FEC apparently hopes to move the date for assessing their standing
from shortly before the election of 2016 (a time when some plaintiffs were
actively opposed by super PACs that accepted contributions above the limit)
to seven or eight months after the election (a time when the campaigns of
2016 had ended).
Of course, if the FEC had rejected the plaintiffs’ complaint within 120
days, no one could have doubted the appropriateness of a determination of
standing on the pre-election date. Refusing an amendment would reward the
FEC’s delay in dismissing the complaint and encourage it to delay in other
cases. Whenever a candidate sought prospective relief, the FEC might delay
action on his case until after Election Day in the hope that his ability to
challenge an adverse ruling would vanish.
The FEC argues that, because the district court complaint challenging
the agency’s unlawful delay is now moot, the court lacks jurisdiction to
amend the complaint. The agency thus maintains that its ruling deprived the
plaintiffs of the ability to challenge its delay (by making the delay moot)
while its delay deprived them of the ability to challenge its ruling (by
pushing the date for determining their standing beyond Election Day). 261
This sort of bind is called a Catch-22. 262
The FEC also argues that the court should refuse to allow amendment
because amendment would be futile; it contends that the amended complaint
would be subject to dismissal on several grounds. The plaintiffs respond that
a complaint is not always futile simply because a trial court must dismiss it.
In 1951, for example, Supreme Court precedent required a trial court to
deny relief to the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education, 263 but the
complaint of these plaintiffs changed history. The plaintiffs contend that the
court has discretion to amend the complaint before considering whether to
dismiss it.
260

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 190-91 (2000);
Hardaway v. D.C. Housing Authority, 843 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
261
The plaintiffs respond in part that, because the FEC’s delay is capable of repetition
and likely to evade review, the initial complaint is not moot. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh
Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 324-35 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that a claim
of unreasonable delay in issuing a license was not mooted by issuance of the license
because the agency was likely to engage in similar delay when the plaintiff sought other
licenses).
262
See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955).
263
98 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Kans. 1951) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927)), rev’d, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The FEC argues that its acquiescence in SpeechNow would be
“contrary to law” only if its decision was “arbitrary or capricious or an
abuse of discretion.” The plaintiffs maintain that any ruling based on an
erroneous view of the law is contrary to law.
The FEC claims that, whether or not its acquiescence in SpeechNow
was contrary to law, it was required to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. In
an advisory opinion sought by a super PAC, it had authorized super PACs to
accept contributions above the statutory limit, 264 and the FECA provides
that someone who relies in good faith on an FEC advisory opinion “shall not
. . . be subject to any sanction provided by this Act.” 265 Although the
plaintiffs have sought only declaratory relief, the FEC maintains that
declaratory relief is itself a sanction. Because the agency’s advisory opinion
deprived it of the ability to impose this sanction, it was required to reject the
plaintiffs’ complaint.
The FEC’s position abandons the usual meaning of the word
“sanction”—a penalty or detriment imposed for violation of a legal
requirement. 266 Moreover, judicial acceptance of the FEC’s conclusion
would provide a way for the agency to insulate all rulings allowing unlawful
practices from judicial review. It would be enough for the agency to
announce its rulings in advisory opinions. 267 The FECA, however, allows
courts to review FEC failures to enforce the law, 268 and a construction of the
statute that would allow the FEC to nullify this provision cannot be
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See
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
ADVISORY
OPINION
2010-11,
http://saos.fec.gov./aodocs/AO%202010-11pdf (Commonsense 10).
265
52 U.S.C.A. § 30108(c)(2) (West 2016).
266
See Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 340 (2010) (“A ‘sanction’ (in the
sense the word is used here) is ‘[t]he detriment, loss of reward, or other coercive
intervention, annexed to a violation of a law as a means of enforcing the law.’ Webster’s
New International Dictionary 2211 (2d ed. 1954) . . . ; see Black’s Law Dictionary 1458
(9th ed. 2009) (“A penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a
law, rule, or order.”)).
267
Suppose, for example, that, the FEC defied the conventional understanding that
administrative agencies may not themselves declare statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Panitz v. District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 29, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Suppose that, rather
than acquiesce in the SpeechNow decision, the FEC invented the SpeechNow decision.
Although no court had yet ruled on the question, the FEC announced in an advisory
opinion sought by a super PAC (1) that all limits on contributions to super PACs were
unconstitutional and (2) that the FEC would no longer enforce these limits. Suppose that
the FEC also invented the Citizens United decision. In an advisory opinion sought by a
corporation, it announced that any statute restricting political expenditures by corporations
and only corporations was unconstitutional. Would no federal court be able to review the
agency’s rulings because an FEC advisory opinion precludes “sanctions” and because
“sanctions” include everything the FEC might do in response to a citizen complaint?
268
52 U.S.C.A. § 30109(a)(8)(C).
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correct. 269
The FEC maintains that, because its advisory opinion authorized the
respondents’ conduct, it could not find this conduct unlawful. In this
argument, the FEC appears to enter the realm of legal philosophy, agreeing
with some legal positivists that any conduct not subject to legal sanction is
lawful. From this perspective, if diplomats have immunity from legal
sanctions when they commit murder, it is lawful for diplomats to murder. 270
Just as the FECA bars administrative sanctions when people have
relied on FEC advisory opinions, a number of doctrines bar criminal
punishment when defendants have relied reasonably on apparently
authoritative assurances that their conduct would be lawful. These doctrines
have such names as “official authorization,” 271 “entrapment by estoppel,” 272
“advice of counsel,” 273 and “mistake of law.” 274
The D.C. Circuit has said, for example, that a defendant charged with a
specific-intent crime “is entitled to an advice-of-counsel instruction
showing: (1) he made full disclosure of all material facts to his attorney
before receiving the advice at issue; and (2) he relied in good faith on the
counsel’s advice that his course of conduct was legal.” 275 Although a lawyer
who provides erroneous advice can thus give his client a defense, this
lawyer cannot amend the law. The client’s conduct, although excused,
remains unlawful. 276 A mistake of law does not change the law—not even
when it rests on an advisory opinion issued by the FEC. 277
269
The FEC maintains that its odd definition of the word “sanctions” is entitled to
Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). The plaintiffs maintain that it is not.
270
For extended criticism of this version of legal positivism, see ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES
139-50 (2000).
271
See Keathley v. Holder, 696 F.3d 644, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2012).
272
See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767,
773-75 (9th Cir. 1987).
273
See United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
274
See United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
government argued that mistake of law is never a defense. There is an exception to the
mistake of law doctrine, however, in circumstances where the mistake results from the
defendant’s reasonable reliance upon an official—but mistaken or later overruled—
statement of the law.”).
275
DeFries, 129 F.3d at 1308.
276
Similarly, the Model Penal Code provides a defense when an actor has acted in
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated statute, a judicial decision or opinion, an
administrative order or grant of permission, or an official interpretation of the law by an
officer charged with its enforcement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Am. Law Inst.,
Proposed Official Draft 1962). The MPC calls this defense, not “Law Amendment by
Government Agencies and Enforcement Officials,” but “Ignorance or Mistake.” Id.
277
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (1961) (noting the inaccuracy of
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When the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from the FEC, they
expected not to get it. The chance of victory before their case reached the
Supreme Court was small. The plaintiffs, however, have been required to
fight many battles just to keep their case on the track that heads toward the
Court. The FEC’s strenuous efforts, not to defend its actions, but to block
any review of its actions may bring to mind such classics as Charles
Dickens’ Bleak House, 278 Rod Serling’s The Twilight Zone, 279 and Philip K.
Howard’s The Death of Common Sense. 280
Skirmishes in the back alleys of federal procedure will continue in Lieu
v. FEC for some time. If the FEC succeeds in delivering a fatal blow to the
case in one of these skirmishes, it may prevent the Supreme Court from ever
considering whether the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow is correct.
Moreover, any ground that prevents the Supreme Court from considering of
the validity of SpeechNow is likely to block the Court from reviewing or
reconsidering any other final decision striking down an election law,
including Citizens United. Even people who applaud SpeechNow and
Citizens United should be troubled by constitutional law’s one-way ratchet
and by decisions that permanently immunize lower court decisions and fiveto-four Supreme Court decisions from reconsideration. 281
reducing law to the proposition that “the score is what the scorer says it is”).
278
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford 1996) (1853).
279
See Adrienne LaFrance, How The Twilight Zone Predicted Our Paranoid Present,
ATLANTIC,
Dec.
31,
2013,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/12/how-em-the-twilight-zone-empredicted-our-paranoid-present/282700/ (describing the television series that ran from 1959
through 1964).
280
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
281
What position the Justice Department will take when Lieu v. FEC reaches the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court is uncertain. In SpeechNow, the Justice Department
defended the constitutionality of the federal statute limiting contributions to super PACs,
and “a major part of the duty of the Solicitor General is to defend laws passed by Congress.
The Office generally takes the position that it will defend any act of Congress for which
there is a plausible argument to be made that a statute is constitutional.” Stephen Wermiel,
SCOTUS for Law Students: What Does the Solicitor General Do?, SCOTUSBLOG, May 2,
2012, http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/scotus-for-law-students-what-does-the-solicitorgeneral-do-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law/. The Department’s duty to defend a
Congressional enactment whose validity the Supreme Court has never considered should
trump its obligation to defend the position of a particular federal agency that has declined
to enforce this enactment in reliance on a lower court decision. The Solicitor General
should decline to represent the FEC and should allow this body to be represented by other
counsel. He should in fact file an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs’ position.
President Trump’s denunciations of super PACs and the administration’s political
interests also counsel support for the plaintiffs. Championing the right to give $20 million
to a super PAC would not make any administration popular, and, in view of President
Trump’s strong statements on the subject, it would be especially incongruous for his
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Part VI
CONCLUSION
A reader might well ask: If the arguments presented in this paper are
sound, why have twenty-four federal circuit judges in six federal courts of
appeals rejected them? The premise of the question, however, is mistaken.
No judge has rejected any of the arguments presented in this paper.
Many judges have disagreed with this Article’s ultimate conclusions (1)
that federal limits on contributions to super PACs are valid and (2) that
nothing in Citizens United should lead to a contrary conclusion. As the
SpeechNow bandwagon gained momentum, 282 however, no court focused on
any of the arguments this Article has offered in support of its position. As
best we can tell, these arguments simply were not advanced in any of the
cases. 283
SpeechNow took as its premise one sentence of the Citizens United
opinion: “We now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 284 The D.C. Circuit
declared that, if independent expenditures do not corrupt, the contributions
that make these expenditures possible cannot corrupt either. 285
We offered two arguments about the court’s premise. First, this
Supreme Court statement was dictum. It was in fact double-dictum. This
statement came after the Court had resolved the case before it twice, and the
statement advanced neither the Court’s holding nor the “extra” ground of
decision it suggested.
administration to defend this supposed right. See text at note __ & note __ supra.
282
Compare New York Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“Few contested legal questions are answered so consistently by so many courts
and judges.”), and Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 527 (5th
Cir. 2013) (“We tread a well-worn path.”), with IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1982) (noting the tendency
of groupthink to supplant independent critical thinking and describing how this
phenomenon contributed to policy fiascos in five presidential administrations). One
naturally tends to assume that Fifty Million Frenchmen Can’t Be Wrong, see
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-IP0DE2kTI, but they probably can be.
283
Before Citizens United and SpeechNow, a Fourth Circuit panel concluded that
North Carolina had not shown that contributions to independent expenditure committees
were sufficiently corrupting to justify their limitation. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,
525 F.3d 274, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2008). Judge Blane Michael, however, dissented. Id. at 33237 (Michael, J., dissenting). The vote in favor of striking down limits on contributions to
super PACs thus has not been unanimous.
284
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
285
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694.
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Second, the Supreme Court probably did not mean this statement
literally. The D.C. Circuit’s analysis depended on reading the statement to
say, not just that independent expenditures are insufficiently corrupting to
justify their restriction, but also that these expenditures do not corrupt even a
smidgen. Other passages of Citizens United and the Court’s decision in
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. 286 suggest that the Court did not mean to
sweep so far beyond the issues before it. Neither SpeechNow nor any of the
decisions that followed it focused on whether this statement was holding
rather than dictum, and none paused over indications that the Supreme Court
might not have meant its statement literally.
We said that the SpeechNow syllogism itself was fallacious.
Contributions to a super PAC can corrupt even when the group’s
expenditures do not corrupt and in fact do the world great good. As Buckley
v. Valeo recognized, it is the people who write the checks, not the money
spenders, who typically corrupt and create the appearance of corruption. 287
Neither SpeechNow nor any of the decisions that followed it examined
challenges to the supposed syllogism.
We offered two criticisms of the syllogism’s conclusion—that
“contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures . . .
cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption.” 288 First, this
conclusion is just silly. When a legislator agrees to vote in favor of widget
subsidies in exchange for a $1 million contribution to a super PAC
supporting his candidacy, the legislator is guilty of bribery. Declaring that
there “is no corrupting ‘quid’ for which a candidate might exchange a
corrupt ‘quo’” 289 does not pass the laugh test. Yet the five courts of appeals
that followed SpeechNow maintained straight faces, apparently because they
did not notice that declaring super PAC contributions non-corrupting “as a
matter of law” would make openly trading these contributions for
government benefits a constitutional right.
Second, the syllogism’s conclusion cannot be reconciled with Buckley
v. Valeo, in which the Supreme Court said, “It is unnecessary to look
beyond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions—in order
to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1000 . . . limitation
[on contributions to candidates].” 290 Neither the D.C. Circuit nor any of the
courts that embraced its decision addressed what should have been the
central issue in the cases before them—whether contributions to super PACs
286
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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56.
288
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can reasonably be distinguished from the contributions to candidates whose
limitation Buckley upheld.
Unlike SpeechNow or any of the decisions that echoed it, we reviewed
the distinctions Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures. We
noted initially that each of the three reasons Buckley offered for treating
contributions to candidates as low-value speech applies fully to
contributions to super PACs. Like a donation to a candidate, (1) a super
PAC contribution does not convey the underlying basis for the contributor’s
support; (2) its transformation into debate requires speech by someone other
than the contributor; and (3) limiting it does not prevent the contribution
from serving as a symbolic expression of support or restrict the contributor’s
ability to discuss candidates and issues. Buckley and its progeny require
treating contribution limits as “‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because
contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political
expression.” 291
Moreover, one of the Buckley Court’s two reasons for viewing
contributions to candidates as less corrupting than expenditures applies
equally to contributions to super PACs. Although the rules forbidding the
coordination of independent expenditures with the expenditures of a
candidate are thought to inhibit corrupt transactions between candidates and
super PAC managers, they cannot inhibit corrupt transactions between
candidates and super PAC donors. These rules do not limit what candidates
and super PAC donors may say to one another.
The Buckley Court’s remaining distinction between contributions to
candidates and independent expenditures was that direct contributions may
be more valuable to candidates. Similarly, candidates may value
contributions to their official campaigns more than they do contributions to
super PACs. A candidate, however, does not value a $5500 dollar
contribution to his campaign more than he does a $1 million contribution to
a super PAC whose mission is to support his candidacy. The Supreme
Court’s ruling that Congress may prohibit the $5500 contribution because it
is corrupting or creates the appearance of corruption cannot be reconciled
with the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that the $1 million contribution is protected
because it does not create even an appearance of corruption. SpeechNow and
the decisions echoing it have created a perverse campaign finance regime—
one in which, although donations supporting candidates are unlimited,
donors must channel these donations to less responsible, more destructive,
and less authoritative speakers than the candidates themselves.
The ultimate question posed by Buckley is whether super PAC
291
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contributions create a sufficient appearance of corruption to justify their
limitation. In 2017, the appearance of corruption in America is widespread
and intense. In the presidential campaign of 2016, candidates of both parties
decried government by the wealthy and denounced super PACs.
Condemnations of “Wall Street,” “Silicon Valley,” “Hollywood,” “the
billionaire class,” “big banks,” “super PACs,” and “the one percent” now
seem as common as denunciations of ISIS. Opinion polls confirm the
public’s loss of faith in our democracy, and Washington insiders voice the
same discouragement and mistrust as the public. The super PACs spawned
by SpeechNow have become powerful symbols of corruption.
Because the most recent of the decisions endorsing SpeechNow came in
2013, the authors of these decisions could not have known the full extent of
the appearance of corruption their decisions would produce. Moreover, the
judges who decided SpeechNow in 2010 might have been unaware, not only
of the social consequences of abrogating the limits on political
contributions, but also of the fact that they were abrogating these limits and
effectively gutting Buckley. David Keating, the president of the nonprofit
association SpeechNow and the principal architect of the SpeechNow
litigation, told an interviewer in 2015 that using an independent expenditure
group to promote a particular candidate “just never entered my mind. But
it’s totally obvious when you think about it.” 292 Attorney General Holder
said that the Justice Department did not seek Supreme Court review of
SpeechNow because this decision would “affect only a small subset of
federally regulated contributions.” 293 The judges of the D.C. Circuit might
have been no less oblivious than the parties on both sides to the beast that
was about to emerge from their opinion.
SpeechNow in fact transformed American politics, intensified class
division and mistrust, and helped to reduce faith in our democracy to a
nadir. A ruling so consequential should not have been left to the D.C.
Circuit or even to six courts of appeals. Seven years after SpeechNow, the
ability of Congress to limit super PAC contributions awaits and requires the
Supreme Court’s attention.
Stay tuned.
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